Loyola University Chicago

Loyola eCommons
Master's Theses

Theses and Dissertations

1956

The Will in Descartes' Doctrine of Error
William A. Schock
Loyola University Chicago

Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_theses
Part of the Philosophy Commons

Recommended Citation
Schock, William A., "The Will in Descartes' Doctrine of Error" (1956). Master's Theses. 1273.
https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_theses/1273

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more
information, please contact ecommons@luc.edu.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.
Copyright © 1956 William A. Schock

THE WIll, IN D.ESG.AHTES·

DOOTRINE OF

}~RROR

by
William A.

S~hoekt

S. J iii

A Thesis SubJtdtte,d to the Faculty of the Graduate School

or

L.oyola University in Putial Ful.t1lment of
the Requireents for the Degreeo£

Master of Arts

TAELE OF OON'lIENTS

Chapter

Page

I.

•

• • •

• • • • • • • • • • • • •

1

• •

•

Purpose-:Pro(H:~dure-Summary of Cartesian doctrine
orientated to the proble-m o~ error-Wh;r error was

a great problem for Descartes.

II.

DESCARTEf:P DOCTRI.tm OF ERROR: A

~"'XTUAL

ANALYBIS ...

17

The nature of error-The four remote sources of
error-The proximate oauses of eJ::ll1'1Or-How Desoartes rel.!lQves blame for error from God-Con....
elusion.

.

III ..

.

.,

. .,

. ..

.

33

II

53

..

70

Thought-Modal d1etinetion-llhe will: its exist-

ence; .1 ts na.ture as a. 11Ow$.r of aftirming and d$nying, as a perl~ect power. and as an unl1m1te4

power.........The understanding 1 pus!va t imperf'ect .'0&cause limited, yet in some vte::I pGrtect, l!lt1d some-

how hav1ng primacy over the vr.i.ll-ll'he judgment:
in t'be will" d1.f'!erent from the understand.1nfh
and differing .from the intellectualist type ~!

intuition ot the

IV.

.

~!.

TfIE ROLE OF THE WILL IN ERHOR • • • .. " • • • • • •

Trt:tth--Where error is not tound-Ma:terial and
formal error-oontused ideas-The will as un11mited. and .free explains error-Omissions in

d&Qtrlne-TW'o gllnG:-al s~es ot el':ror caused.
by the unl!:m1ted and. tree will-Summa.r:r.

v.

ORtTIOISM ..

if

..

~

..

•

..

..

..

..

..

•

"

ill

..

•

•

..

..

Olni.sa1ons in doctrine-Two internal di£fieul....
t1e~Seven external di£.f'icult1es-Ooncluslon.

..

.

OHA.PTEli: I

INTHODUCTION
This th&ai.s is an analysis of DesGal."tes· doctr.tne on the
~()le

of the vrlll L'"l bie $oltd;ion to the probl_ of error.

general t we inten4 to giVEl a sympathet.;i.e analysis of his

In
po81-

rt1on.and then to cO!ls1der its di£!1culties. both internal and
~x:ternal..

IJ:herEi seem to be two in:t;ez·ne.l ditiicul ties in his ex"",

tplanat.1o:n. ot tu."'l'or.

(1) Desoartes' pUJ."POse in bI'.1ng1ng th. will

into the question of errQr wu to avoid plaoing the bl_8 tor
e1"roron God.

The qU$stio.u,.

coapl:1.shed. hia P\U"'pcuse"

not

.~O%'is

how&ver~

is whether or not he

8..¢-

(2) The second di.f'ticulty i.e whether or

aotual.ly apt: ou.t of tneintellect, although Dea-

eartse continually .statea that the will and not the intellect i8
the ¢aU$'$ of error.
In
~e

consideX'in{~

the extex'l'lal d1:t:tieulti$8 of his :polS! tion,

shall ti.ud it neoessary to evaluate Desoartes on the following

t>oints ot his

doctr1ne~

standing 1s passive.
jud,pent is tQr h1.m

(1) D$$carte$ holds that the under-

(2) Although he places truth in Judgment,
prim.ar1~

an act

or

the will,

(p) He hol.ds

that er;r:or is in judgment &lld t hence, primarily an act of the
nll.For Descartes t theory of jud@.;ment states that the will
1

2

judges (affirms or denies) what 1$ presented to it by the

standing.

(it) lie bases his explanation of judgment on clear atld

dist1nctldeas.
assent.

.unde~

(5) He sees no difte.ranc.6 'between consent and

(6) DeSC£lrtes says that the will is most tree when it

1saompelled, by God or by a olear and distinct idea, to a..Beent.
(7) And finally, he denies that God concul's in a raistaken judg-

ment because erroX' is a pri vat1.Qn and not areal -being.
In genertU'tour

pro4ed~wi.ll

be as follows.

In what ,re-

ma.iJl$ of' the introduotion .e shall present a brief summary ot

Descartes J philosophy..

reasons.

$~

will be necefJu,ary for three

First of all, stteh asWIll1lrur,y will tie togetller the

tb::cee main works o£
1)i$.~smn

This

i! la

J)e:sc~tes

whioh w111 be used in this t.hes:1.s1

,/

.yttin~t ~~t4tiiO:p.!1 ~ .PEi~8r Ph1lo!9pbia,

l:~a.1 ~.19IO~

(EiD

~t

a

&t'J.d

l~lM1oa:~;1! Osumi~1o~i

The s~, therefore, wil.l tend. to give greater

1_,).1

un! ty·to the presentation, and will halp us a.void th. n.ecessi ty
0:£

8~art1!).g

ldll!lldias!:l!.

Seeondly,.many basio points ot D.$:-

cartes f generaldoetrine will be &xpla1ned in the

s:~,

which

will b. referred to but Mt explained in. 'the thesis 1 tsel!' ..
Thi$w111 help make the p.r-e'ae1ltation

1lOr$

1ntel11gible...

And

finally.. th:i$ summary will be a Cartesian introduotion to the
pl.'lIObl$:m 01" erro:t"t aine&

quest.ion of error.
f

.b!t

we ahall try to orienta:te it to the

Prom tb.1$

SUJmrUll.ry

one will 'be able to see

:;
clearly why eX';t'or was sueh a problem for Desoartes.

part of the introduction, a£ter the

$l.1lII.mEU"y

In the last

is completed, we

shall rater to the opinions of three oonmtente:twrs who also point
out wby Descartes waS driven. by the foundations of his philo.sophy. to uplain error, andwby .h1.s philosophy made it a diffi-

cult problem to solve.
Chapter 2 will con1'ain a. gel'l.eral. textual. analysis of what

D$:soar1ies propose$ in th$
E~~!)on

the solution to the problem ot error..

followed in ohaptex'
'U!l4ers~and1ng,

three

M.e~~~i~ g,uK~a and ?~aJ\s1Ja1a

cQnc~:pts

~

(E!a

Tcla w.Ul be

by a closer analysiS of his notiQns ot the

A clear knowledge ot these

will, en4. dudgment.

is lleeessary to properly locate the will in the

queation of ell"l"Or.

Although the matter £01' the second chapter

will. betaken exc.lus1vely .from the works of De$cartes, we shall,
in the 'IIhird and .!ourth chapters, also use the various eommen-

tariea on Descartes wn&nevsX'

th~

are helpful.

Ohapter 1+ will

eQntaina further analyai s of' erx'or ovel=' end above the textual
analysi S ot ehapter 2.

In th1.$ chapter we shall flee

Desoartes explains an erroneous judgment as an act

or

ole~ly

how

the will.

Then in chapter 5 we shall end with an evalua·tton of 'tille exterrlal and .i.ntern&.l di.t::ticulties of Descartes t

doctl.~1n..

In the bodyot the thesis. chapters 2. 3. and 4, as well as

in th. introductory summary, we shall try, as tar as posel1;>le,

to let Descartes spe.ak for himself..
no,t allow

~)eseartes

.:.,'or it seems that if we did

to prefHmt his owndootrine as he saw it,

4-

he reader would not be able to understan.d very clearly what was
escartes and what was

ou~

interpretation of him.

So perhaps it

11 be better to lend a sympathetic ear to the .French p.hilosoan,y criticism. as WEi go along, except in a. footnote

when it seems advisable.

Once we understand elearly what

actually trying to s,y, we can criticize him in a separate

(5) ooncerning those points which. seem to need criticism.
In his youth Descartes found that only mathematics gave him
satisfaction because of the certitude which he d.istinctly
clearly found in it;2 and as tor the philosophy he learned
rom his Jesuit teaohers, his comments are anything but tavorble. 3 He wondtred that such a vast superstructure of knowled.ge

s built by men of the sohools on such a nak and invalid set ot
stulates. w,bile tht:tr$ was no superstruoture built upon the
ound postulates Qf mathema.tios. 4

So he decid.ed 'to start trom

he bottom, tor how ean he take anything tor granted tbat he has
.2Rene'" Desea;rtes., Di,.sCOll:t"J:1

/
M rameth9de..
Oeuvres de D...El,!-

as trans" Adam &, Tannery (J?--ars t 1904 j , v!, ?• ItIi me
.f'oiiii~$OiiiioloOlS su.rtout aux MathematiquEhl, a cause de Is. certitude f',:: de
• euidenoe de leurs rai sons., ,.

3;reid.., !!li' 8-9. ule", ne di~ .I'1en de la Philo$oph1e .. sinon
U8, voyant quelle a eate oult1uee par les plus exeellena esrita qui ayent vasou depuis plusieurs siecles. &. que neanmoins
1 M sfy trouue eneore aUCUlle chose dont on ne dispute, &. par
onsequent qui ne soit douteuse •• ,.Cfest pourquoYt aitost que
'aage me permit desort1r de la euiation de mes Precepteurs, 1e
u1tta:;y int1erement It estude des lettres. l !

4lbid't p_ 7. •••• •1e m'estonno1s de os que, leurs i"ondemens
ste.ns" sI te~lle$ & 8i solideSt on nfauoit rien basti dessus de
1

..

tt

yet le~lrned t sincE! these pril1Ciples have led him and others into
all sorts ot talse cC'::lclusiollS?

He decided. there.fore" to dis-

card all

and to start from trlings that

OpiniOI1S,

even his
t:

are clear and. distillCt.':>

OW!l,

The me-thad he ehooses to follow is

fOl.'med upon t};e firm and solid model furnished b:y mathematics ..

He ela1ms, moreover, that his method is superior to .ll.t1.stotelian
laglo, i.l1.o1uding even the time-honored syllogism, since this tool

does not help him. to acquire any new knowledge ~ From the very
start t therefore f Descartes
planation of

erl"OX'.

f)1nc~

l'AS

found grounds

der~ing

an ex-

error is m.an1testly prevalent in.

philosopf'!y, he immedia.tely, although implicitly, must ask him-

salt': What is the nature and cause ot error?
. He exp11ci tl;r oonc.erns h1mself with error in his logical
rulest whiCh are means o:lavoiding error in his illvestigation.,
R1sp.r'1.naiples of logiC are: (1) to recei va nothing as true
~eh

j.s not evidentl;y known to be auch, by its presenting it-

selt to the mind with a clearn..s$ and distinetness which uolud.e

all doubt,(2) to divide. as far a.s possible, everyd1.r.rioult
~rQble;m

into its natural parts; (3) to conduct one's thoughts in

~u..order,

advancing gradually :from the more simple a..ndftsy tb

ithe more compl$x and diffioult, and to suppose a definite order

5;tb.~. ~

p .• 16.

6~
. 'W t
p. 17 f

,it.

•
.......:1
...
prl.s
ga"i'U.e
que, pour 1 a .LogJ..que,
ses
syllo . $mEte &: Is. piu.apart de ses a.utres instru.ctions seruent
plutost a ex,pli.quer a aut~ les choses qu'on s.9ait. ou mesme •••
It

•
:u~

sans ju.g_ent, de celles qu·on ignore, quta les apprendre."

6

for the sake of orderly progress ·0£ the investiga.tion.. even when
none su·cll. is supplied in the natul.'e of the sub(ject to be in'Vest1.gated; and (4) by oompleteness in enumerations and oompl.eteness

in reviews tb make sure th...a.t nothing has been overloolced. 7
Descartes g08S on to enumeX'B.te certain etLieal rules,
adopted by him provisio!lal.lYf . that iS t until he could. work out s.

sa.tisfactory moral philosophy.

The first is to tollow the laws

and customs o:f his country. to hold fast to the religion in whicn
he has "'been educated, a.nd alwE\ya in practioal lite to follow the
llloet moderate and most generally received maxims.

l1he

second

requires consistency in action; and the third. lXloderateneas in

his d.emands in

1'$$p60t

to external

E~ood,s.

By the foul."th he re...

solves to dedioa.te his lite to the cultivation ot his reason.
p

and to the discovery of scientific

t~ut.hs. U

The first moral

ma::!tim, although it wilJ. not solve the problem of error

i'~"o:m

the

specu.lative standpoin.t, will '.b.elp him. avoid ettor in practical

..."eryday- 11v1:o.g ...

In the fourth and filth sections of tlte .DisgouX'!

q,t

~

Se,ihod!
Descru.."tespresents outlines of the doctrine wbich he de"
velopea in the

M!dita.tioni~

andPrincip1a.

In the

~il5i:JatCiuone$

he seeks to demonstrate the e:ld.stenee of God and the existence

ot the soul as an independellt entity, separa.ble from the
.'

. t

f.

'7Ibi~. , pp. 18-19.

-

BIbid.. , pp. 22-28.

body ..

?
Although these two point, seem to be his main purpose in writing
the Med.1tationet!J; it is lvortby of note that a whole meditation

(IV) 1$ devoted to the question of truth a...1'1d erx:or.

In the first medita.tion he shows us that all things may be
doubted, exoept the ;fact tl:l3.t we doubt.

And since doubting

kind. of thinld.ng, we cannot d.oubt that We th.i:nk..

is

a

He must have

all Ids principles on a secure baSiS, but, si:nee the op1ntons he

has already accepted have at titleS led hirJl e.atra.1',9 sinoe his

senSes have at ti:mes deceived :hi!r.~ 10 and since dreams deceive him
as well, 11 he must doubt o.t all these t:b~ngs until !'.e has proved

them true or fa.1se.

He even say-s that his imperfection !night be

so great that he is e,lways deceived. 12

eut since be does tbink,

and since h$ is able to doubt , he must at least; exist, Thecretors, "I exist'" is a,lwa.:ys true. l ; Ani! with this we have entered
.flt

91_~. I. A.T., VIr. 17.

·,Animadvert! ,janlante aliquot annos

quam mUI'i'a, ineunteae.ta.te. tusa pro varia adi:;.,i13ex'im f & quam
du'bi.a s.1nt quaecunque ietis postea superextruxi, ae proinde fundi tus omnia stmel in vi. ta esse evex:'teooa.atque a primis lundamentia clenuo incboandum, s1 quid aliquando .f'irmwn Sk mt!UlSuruI!l

oupiam in seient1is atabilire. It

lO~q~~:t t !>.).8.

HUem.pe quidquid hactenus ut maxime vex"Um.

adm.isi,v6_ a sensibua, vel per sensus accepi;

110S aut. 1nterdum fallers deprehendi.. ac prudentiae est nunquam 11U$ :plane
confiders g.ui nOB vel semel deceperunt.!I
11
Ibid., pp. 19-20.

12Ib!d. t p. 21.
1

"iii:

t VII. 25.
rlAdec ut, omnibus satis superque
pensitatri, a:'inique statu.em.um slt hoo pronuntiatum, fog $WXtt
Sas!;atSh quoties a me protertur, vel menteconcipiw:'. neaes-

.w

ifil";:i n

.?l,led. il, A.T.

... ~.

.

It

----

:

8

the second meditation.
:J:'his process of methodical doubt is. in4l.eed, radical.

But

it certainly shows us to what ext:eeme lengths Desc4s wa.s

willing to go in order to achieve ceFtitude,. to a.void error.

In the third mooi tat10n Descartes treats the subj act 0.£ our
knowledge of God.

He thinks that he oan first; formulate a prin-

ciple which will assUl'"G him of the certainty ot thingfill.

I t is

the principle which he dar! ved experimentall;y from the prooess of

aSlSerting his own existeno.e.

Since he has clearly and distinctly

conce! ved thn t he truly ex1 Glia. he can now la:y down tn.a genaral
rul.e for asserting the certainty

or 8117 idea; :i.E the conception

is clear and diatinct • it is true. 14

This rule would be talse

only i1' there were some POfll'ful being t superior to himself f who
deceives him in all things.

80

he must destroy the possibil.ity

o~ sueh a. d&ceiver .. 15 Again we see Descartes obsesa~ with a
qu·&st tor certitude,

wi til au.

attempt to avoid error. which ,we

might add; is altogether pra.iseworthy..

Although he has not yet

explle1.tl,. &xplai.ned the nature and cause of error,

that he l'!'lUst..

And in treating of ttle

how this cause

CM

C8.w;'J.e

~

can see

of er:ror he must show

be overoome so that he can avoid error.

De.cartes begiI1s his investigation of the knowledge we pos.....

14!e4. III, A.iT., VII, 35. *' .... 8.0 proinde jam. videor -pro
regul.e. gensrffi posse statueret i11itd OWlS esse verum, quod
valdeelare & distincte ·perclpio. If

15f.b~ •• p. 36. » ••• quamprimum ooeurret oocasio, examinare
an · t D$Us . &. si sit an P9sait esse deceJ)tor~. hac aniIn
re1~'1l0ra a, non ~l.a&or de U11& al.l.8. p~an$ ¢ertus &.$se \uiquam posse
d.eb~o

sess 01' God by considering his own mind.

Ris thou.ghts are

either images of things.16 acts of the 'rill of judgments.

Ideas.

moreover, are innate, or they oome !rom without, or they are
found a.s tormed hy -the thinker himself .17

But how do we knoW'

whether an idea represents a real thing external to us'?

swer is that d1fterent ideas have a: different measure

or

His an-

objec-

tive reality, that is, they participate as representa:tiva bages
.:
in J.~igher or interior degrees of beinf§ or perfection. 18
~{1 th

tl1is as a baokground,Des<tartes can .now prove the exis-

tence ot God"

}!'or him the idea. of $ub$tanee ha.s more reali ty

than the idea ot acoident; and the 1(lae. of an in£111i te t eter11a.l,

unehange:able, oID.lllse1ent. om:n1potent being, the crea.tor ot all
fini 'bEt things t has more ideal real! t:r than the ideas that repre-

s-ent substances.

Now there ean be no more reality in the e.tf'eot

than in the oompletf:!f qause J the cause must oontain the $:a.m.e
:f\&alities or reali ti&8 superior to those that are in the efl.'ect •.
Sinoe I am .finite, the idea of an intin1te substance could no't be

if this idea did not come trom a really existing in.tlnite
stl:bstanoe. 19 Desoartes gives other tU."guzm;mts :for 'bhe .r.tstEmce·
in

m~t

1611>1<1..
Pill
r
..t

nom-ell ....

I

17Ibid. ,

37.

'* .. t .nuibus solis 'nT'oprie conv.ani t ideae

pp. 37-';8.

18101d • t I'p. 313-40.

19;f:'bi~ ... pp.

40-41.

'"

~

.
10
of C4Xl, but it will not serve our purpose to go intotheo all

here.
But this p:t'esents Descartes with a ra:ther difficult problem
As we shall seGin the next ohapter, he shoWS that C'TOd is vera...

o1Qus, and that

a1~

our £ao11lt1&8 come trom the God whose exis-

tence he has just proved.
wou.ld

And.

~eem

$0,

But it our tacntlties come .from God t i

tn,at he deceives us by allovd.ng oU.r faculties to err ..

Descartes must somehow reoonoi.leou.r God-given faoulties

which sometimes err, with the veraoity of God.

W. shall not discuss the fourth meditation here since this
is tIte sub3ect matter for a luge part

o~

the next chapter.

The

futh medi tatiotl takes uptbe nature of material. things and

proves I)·noe more the existenoe ot God; so we need not go into
t111s

m~i tat ion

either ..

In the sixth meditation Descartes concludes trom the olear
and distinct knowledge we haiVG of extension and of bodies, and

fA"om our distinct eOrlsQ1ousneas of ideas d.t$crmine4 by an external and material cause, that bodies really exist. and t:tat we

not

d.c~ived

ax'

in our idea of a material world.

For, it thi$ were
not the ea.se, the ground ot our deception. would be God. 20 On
the other l.t.and, the sEmea.tiol1s o£ color, sound, taste. ete .. t and
tUSf.)

pain and ploasu:t'8 t are 'Vi$WeQ. by him as merely subj active ..

Yet. from the fact that we have
;' t.

a.

clear and distinct idea of

11

ourselves as a thinking substanoe t 21 and since in this idea no
reJ}resentation of an;ytbing material is oontai.n,ed, Descartes in;t'el."S the irA.9pendent eldstenc~ ot our mind trom the body. 22
In the l~rL"lej.~ia I'hf.~o'~0»!R~e there is a treatment in suc-

cessiva seotions ot. the prinoiples. of humall kno\fledge, th.e principles o! material things, 'the visible world, and the earth.

Theiirat part, which is the part most impo:rtant tor our eOTJsid...
eratio!:, is a recapi tulation 01: the principles laid down in the

Iii;:tdt tatioIl;e,§. though Desca.rtes is more explicit on many pointe
iu this W'oz-k than he was in the famel" Oiled! ~at1onef!)"

In

~a.x:!

.Pr;ha?, we

a:l'."e

given a number ot valuable definitioTlS.

among which are th.e importa.."tt on$S of clearness and distinctness
III term that clear whioh is

pl'es~nta..1ld

apparent to an attentive

m.ind. in the aame way as we uaert that we see objects clearly
w~.

being pre.sent to. the regarding eye, they operatB upon it

with sll.f'ficJj,ent strength..

preoise and dif£erant
within i tmelt

nothint~

But the distinct is that which is so

.tro~

all other objects that i t eo:r~tains
23
but wh.fit is clear. 1f But if a clear and

distinct idea is always true, as stated above, we ea..'I'l con.elude
only that error 1s found elsewhere.

So Descartes

r~n.lst

ansv/er

the question1 Where is error found?
21 t bid. ~ p. 78, (l1res Gogitans-).

-

22 Ibid •

2~:asne Deaeart~$t The:~hiloBf->l?llical WOrks of Desca;t'ta,~,
tra.ns, Haldane a:od !1;oss~amtirla:g$. It.15I)~ !, 2"97.

He defines substance,

By substanoe t we oan understand noth-

It

ingelse than a th1llg wb.1ehso

in order to eJd.st. ,.24

~sts ~ha:t:it

needs no otruu- thing

He 'then ru.\dsthat only one substance oan

be oonceiv.a. as plainly needing nothing else in ol:'der to exist.
namely God; and, thus,substenoe cannot be applled 'both to God
and to erea.tures in an

umvooal m811ner. 25 although created sub-

at$tloe can be app11ed uni voca.l17 to both oOl.'POreal and. thinking
substance.s. 26 From the eGst~c. of any attr1bute we: oan oonclude to an existing

thi~

or substanoe to which it belongs; but

everj" $ubstance has a pre-em1nent a'ttrlbute, which constitutes

its nature and essence. and to whioh all others :r.-elat..
e:x:tel'18i.on in tlu"ee d.imens:i.ons constitutes the nature

a.l sUbstance.

Por

eve~

!buSt

ot eorpore-

else whiCh can be asoribed to

b041ea pre$U.ppoae exteXlJ!d.on and is only s.OJlle mode of an ex-

teM.,.

bOd.y.

Lilt.wise.all things whioh we tind in the m1n4

(th1.nld.qsubstanoe) ·are s1m.pl3'd1verse modes

ot thought.. :r1gu:te

anet motlon are aod$s of exteuion; 1mag1na'h1on,. sensation. and
will are modes

ot 't~..ought. 27

But it doe. seem strange .. as we

shaU ••• ;Mar! tun remarking. that a being t whose eSS$Jloe 1 t 1s

2l1-Haldane and Hess., P.

239.

25~M.l p, 24. 'tAtqu. ideo nomen substant1aenon oon- ,
ven1t Dec ~ 1 lis .'Jfoee" ut diod. solet 1n Hchol1s, hoc est,
nulla e~'WI nominisTiii!!1cat10 pOi:est distincte int'elligi t quae
Veo & oreaturis sit oommun:i.s. t1

26Ib1~. t pp. 24-25.
27Ib1d't p .• 25-.
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(') think, could ever be subjeot to error.

1'1'118 is another <11If1-

ultypreaentillg 1tseU to D$sea:rtes' solution to the problem of

Other points ot

p~s ~

pertinent to thi.s chapter will be

uttic,ie.ntly treated in the following chapters;

to the h.ere.

It

$0 w&

need hot EO

1s wortl'l..;y of note, however, that Deso.a.t'tes

oncl.udes the Mpgipia

b~

saying that he 1s r&ady to submit to

he authori.ty Qf the OhU1"'Cheoncerning the me:terial he has
~ted.28
A;¥1 sow. see trom our

swmnat~on

ot some .tu.ndamental points

t D$ooetes f doctrine that eftOr presented .. serious and ditf1t

~b.lem

:tor l::Lim.

H$ was contrented with

o""e. bed to exp.l.:ain it.

$~rtand,

'bhere-

He pos! ted. logioal wIe& to avoid error

pectulatlvely .• and monJ. rul.es to avoid error pl."actieally.

oleer and distinot ideaa

aN

alwa;ys 'true, and..80 we

ean besu;bj$ot to erroneous ld$u.
'om•.f:rom God. who is not

&

4eceiv$r, how tth'Gn is

thout plae1ng any blaae on God?
$Ubstanc4, a being 'Whoa&

Vuiou.s

o~ntators

ap~MtiOtl

ot e:tTOr

He

Our ,faculties
erro~ '.PO$$ib~

And .f'1J::t.aJ.17 .. how can a think.....

e$SOl'lee

it is to think,oesubjeet

have alBo notie.d 'the ke7 po,! tion that

);!..a4 in thaCartes1a.nIO"$tem.

Among them

s h •... Leo Keeler. who states: HDesc:artes 18 the third great
(atter Plato and

st..

Augustine) t tor whom the faot of

114-

$~Qr rused an important philosophioa:l. p~Obl&m .... 29 And a number of li,..ltaly answers present themselve.8 to &n$wer the question,
On the one hand. it was Descartes- opinion that error had

why?

a. wide prev"lenee in neul;r all departments of knowledge.

On

the other hand.. he believed that truth was comparative1." ea.sy to
aoqutre

fOI'

tll.1:l.7One with

Il

Xllature mind.

But he saw tbs.t

~l1Y

pbtlosopher$ were mistak$n in their in.terpretation of the
CUI·

faets of fllxperlexu.le,.

~bv1-

Why, then" so many mistakes when marl

eant'eaeh eerttdn knowledge '0,- means of methodical dQubt. a

ra41&ll. though necessarystratagent in the present circumstances?

This. method •. as we saw, eonee:ives of all oonvict1ol:1e as doubt.tttl·

a:na

&v&n

erroneous until px-oven true.Tb.1s fact J together

w1.th th$ doct'r1ne of l)flIsearte.e on the passiveness of the intel-·
le'Ot, 'Whietl we Shal.l discuss later, ma.kes it necessaryf'orhim to

expNss h1msel! rather tully on the poesibility and nature ot
errt)X"..

Fort it error a.otually exists t thOu.gh not necessari ly ,

he must show hower.ror is possible end in what it consists.
BU.tl o:the.1" philosophers hav·e let
D$sea.rtes?

th~

question slEJep; whjr not

Perhaps there was tL"1oth$l' motive tor ttndertaki.ng a

$olution to the vexing problem of error.

And so there was.

Sinoe Descartes knew that God cannot deeeive us and is the ulti:mate souroe o,f all our olear and distinot ideas, it would seem
thAt all
I.

our
t,

ideas are true, an.d cOllsequently, that e,rror is im-

15
poas1ble.

Desoartes has made divine veracity the cr1terton of

all oertain knowledge of the outside world; and so he rea.sons
that an all-wiBe. all-good. and omnislent
God would not. rather.
1\
sub~eot

could not give us an intellect and will
1d&as are clear e.nd distinct.

to error when the

Butt as Keeler remarks, this argu-

ment seems to pro,\re too much; sinoe Descertes Inustask and. an-

swer the question: How could suoh a
are'~ver sttbject to 81"ror1 30

Descartes, is. the-relars,

a.

give us faoulties that

God

"The problem of error as posed b7
~1eular

aspect ,ot'the metaphysical

problem ot evil in the world. u31
It&$l1ng $xpre8S.. tho tmportan<>e of the problem of el!"rO%' for
DeSlcl.iWtes in this way: -He ftadilzr sees that the crucial problem
of epistemology is t·o explain,) not the 1>0$$.1.b111 ty of knowledge.
but the !>Oasibility ot error.

And what he sees eo olearJiy is

not merely trAt no theory ot truth

wEuen

fails to provide a

sati.sfactory theory of error is aooeptable. but the

tu;rtl:u,~

.tact, that by exam.1niXlg the constitution of erroneous belief we
shall be laying b.are at the ,same t1lUe the oonstitut1.o11 of knowledge., u;2
Finally. Ma:l;'i tain gj:ves us one more reason w:b;rDesoartes

mu$t eons;i.,der this problem.
lna:ll

Due to the Cartesian conoept1oIl of

as a thinking substance. error raises an almost inElu:perable
in

n

:;°;tP;Lf1 -1

lh 14·2.

;lI'b1d •
. !

.10 4' ~,

;;as.V~ Keeling •. Desoe.ruea (l.-Ondon. 19~), p. 156.
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1.f'f1eult;y.

How is it poss.ible that I should be mistaken, since

. am a spirit?

How ean a substance, whose essence is to think,

hink wronCi:1y?33
These are J.!

p'£io~~ o~

U ;lsea:'easons

whioh demand that Des-

investigate this qUEult1on;:ather thoroughly"

There is a1-

obviousd;.e tac1tg ind.icat1on whioh shows that 'this problem

st have

o_n ot the utmotJt

im:PQl."tance

have devoted a whole meditation
seotions of tha.t put of the
lll.'ttl1lUl

lo.r hil'l1.

(~t!lif.l

l)r~o.~

Wb,7 elae would

gU¥:¥I) ani

m~

that is eonoerned w1 th

knowledge (.Pus ?rw) to its solution?

IrQX"' th•••

:p:t'oblfml for

reasons. 'thex'$fo:t"., we find that \!Wror is a g;rea:t

D.e~t$s~

gl.'1Jater~

at othf)r philQsophel.'lh

Id

r •

p&rhe-ps. tor Descar't.;.s than tor
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W. have seen tl).at the problem.

or

error was extwmely i:tnpol.--

taut for Descartes. and. that it stemmed basically irom his
tellt ot philosophy.
G'X"l:'O,'t'

tll$$$ two

el."irOr.

lifow let us conaider the detailed dOQtr:tne of

as he presented 1 t in

2s"U~W:ie (Klt,@

.,-S-

,i'l:'.!:M)"

tens in those

1Jl;~.~o ~!

This

ai.ttc1l!!!:

p~se;a.t chapter Will be

p~ts

:meM.1ttU~o ~t

and

pertinent

fro

~Jr-

a $twl\.y ot

our dis'OU$:$iol'l. of

01: Gour_. is oompletely d&1toted

to tll. study ot e.rror (and t:ru:bh),. While th.e first pert of the
~~:e~!

is eonoer:ntd with human knowledge in, general; so we

shall seleQt only tl'loseseetionsot this latter work which will

el.e.ri1'y and augm.ent th. tamer woX'k.,

In. geneftl,we shall treat

.fo~

points: the llatu.re of errQr;, the causes otel:'ror. both r&-

mot~

·and prold.mat&; euld. the man.tl.Ol' in whiCh De.cart•• removes

rulYblame for our el.'1'Ora from God.
fum1ng our at1ientJ.on. th€W, to the tirst point of consid.-

eration. let

us in

~e

U$st)~

!iim:tie:t19

Desoartes' 4.scription ot error.
~:YIi::ti

:He tells

that tlerNl.' .S suoh 1s not something

17

18
raal which depends upon God .. but only

It

detieieney ... l

Dist1n-

guislling i'1.u:thsr h' £cutes that -error is not a pure negation
(that is t. it 1$ not

a. simple deficiency or laok ot some pertec-

tion which is not ml1 due).2 but mtheX" a p~ivation (or laok)3 ot

Bome knowl,edge wtich it seems to me that I should po-SS&as. n4
This 1s D·escartes' doctrine

011.

the nawre of

errOTas

£oul1d

error in much the same m.a:tlJler, although here he makes ano·tiher
d.1$tlr.~ction

$flotting that in some sense error is a nagationl

uTba:t our el"rors in respoot of God are but negations, "h11·s in

rG$peet to ourselves they ar. privations

son they are llegations as

£ar

u

tion.
f J(I

defects. u5

The

Ha-

God is concerned 1sthat they do

11,ot J:(\}quire the actual assistanJl$

be: ;produoed. 6

01.'

ot

God j.n

order

that thay may

..\nd finally" Descal.'tes adds one further d1stiJu;....

\1$ $.aw th.at

error is a defeot or privation; but this does

J J~H

.'. IRene De8c~te.s, Med}.tatiLot4s, tl.~e.xlS .. :L.J •. :La:E'leur
1951). p. 49.

(l:iew York,

2The clause "n!est pas 1e 51:mp10 de:,(aut 0\1 manquement de
quelq.u.e . peri'actiQ 'lui ~e. m'est po~nt ~euef: is not found in the
Original Latin.. (Cf ... ~. l.Y, A. T... , .LX. 43~.·)
3The phl"a.se It a1 va earEmt1a It is not f'ouM in the French
translation.. (cr. !Y~ed. ll. A. T•.• VIr, 55.)

14:~l.4iita.ti(n·uh LeJfleur~ p. 49.

trans:~:id::O!~.:~"~(j~;!~i~i~l3~tf~ ij2:!a~.te$t·
64'~"'*
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not mean tor lUm that it is a 4.t.~t in our nature; 7 for if this

were true, we would have no poasd.btl1t'y of exonerating God. sioo.
He would 1nthis case have given usa. detective natlJ.:re..

Altho'tlgh

our $rrors are not detects ot our nature, they are I'the detects
of our mode ot dtion. n $

Andthl..s mode of aotion that causes era

ror is .,. the manner in. which we 'Use our .freedom. It '"
Raving seen how Descartes discusses the nature d: error,
US

proceed to oonsider the oauses ot error.

and the ~:rine1p'i.!

(E!!:!

In Med"1t,,tio

~et

~1;a

Prlp,s..) he treats the proxima:oe causes ot

erI'l)r, namely t the 1dll md un4uBtanding..

But

.turther on in.

the n1nci]!ia he discusses the remote causes or so'tU"Oes ot error.
It i.e to the r&oote ·soux-ees10 tbat we nO'w turn our attention•
.AlthQugh

the

~ox1mate

08.\1." ot

error are not the primax.-y con-

oern of thi.s thesis, it is M$essa'!."Y also to allow Deses.rtes to
po1ntaut what he oonsiden the 1'$m.ote sources of

~or

to be.

They are foul' in n'Ulttbe%t= (1) prejudiceso:f ch11dhood; (2) the

faO't that we cannot ,forget .bout these Fejud1ces.; (;) that . .
be$ome fatigued b:y attJ:ltl41.ng to thoa$ objeots wh10h are not pr'.....
1.1

•

?IbMlt p. 254«

8Ib~d.
9fbidit

lOAlthough Desoartes does not use the distincti.on between

remote and

pro~ima.te caw.;es of error, the disti.l.1.clticn seems to
He refers to theae .tour causes as eauses;we might,
nevertheJ.ess. consider them as rellloie s,qu¥c,es of eJ."ror, to distinguish t~em from the uro~ms:t,e 9us!.~ 0 error, the will 8.lld

be -valid..

und~rstandi;ag.,

20

sented to the senses; and (4) that we attaoh our thought to worda
which do not exPress thjm with aoou%'t.cy t

Now let us analyze these foul' remote souroes more thoroug1'>..ly,

1)

t1

(TJhe principle <lause of error is tou..nd in the prejuDue to the faot tr..a.t i:n _rl,., life the

dices of ohildhooa.. ,,11

mind was so thoroughly bou.nd to the body. it attended to noth11l.g

exoept thoughts by w:b..ich it :perceived objects that mad.e impressions on the bod,y.

As

7~t

the mind did not refer t.bese thoughts

to anythi.:ng e:.rlst;1ng beyond itself.

The mind simply felt pain

or pleastu"e t or sensations t whioh ar& reJ!l'essntatd.ons oJ: nothing
ou.tside the mind .. and wl".1.ch vary as the body is a£feeted.

Later

on,.b.ovrever, when tIle body followed what vias harmful or benef!....
ci~;.l,

the

r~ind.

which Vias at.ill closely oonnected to the body.,

refle·e,ted on the objects it pursues or avoids,
th$ .:r;ix'st time that theyexl$t outside i t.sal!'.
mind attributed to

and

m~

orl&s.s

tha$~

other qual.ities.
~eal1ty

and.remt3.rk~d

tor

Therefore. 'the

objects magnitude, fiEllre. col(,'r, taste,
p" f'irst judged that the:r.'e~'as f,;reate.r

in eao.h objedt as the il'npress1on it

bo();;y we-a lItore or less pov/srful.

For

O.(;lU8:eS

on t

1rl£~ta.rlce,

the mind is led
to believe that tll.ere is lrLOre substance in roeks than in air. 12
:L'i.kewise. our mind has been tilled with so ma,n.y other such

prejudices frolll infancy.. which we later accepted wi thout su..ffi-

U Haldane a.nd Hoss, p. 249.
12

21

cient explanation., and e.d.l:aitted as possessing -truth and elearn.$$, as i t they had been known by our a_nses or :Lmplanted in us
by nature..

But as a JIlatter 01.' fact t in early life we knew things

clearly, perhaps, but eerta.:J.ruy not d.19tinatly.l,
2) "(~ he second. cause of our errors is that we cannot fo1"-

I~gt tljese PNjUdioes.:,14 Although in later life, when the mind
is no longer Wholly subjedt to ~"le body t an~$ no longer in the

habit of ra.t.'en-ing objects to the body. it seel;;s, instead, to
inves't1.ga.te the truth of things in thef:1sel1tes.
WIJ!.t"!I we observe a great m.an;y judgm.ents

Still. it is $Xtremely diffiou.lt to
judf?:~.!llEH1t$;

And so t in this

we have !!la.de in early life.

61&9.1"

our memory of these

a!'A. as long as they remain there t they are the sourcel

of error. l5
It 1s necessary, th.erefore. to clean up our

mel.no~t

as it

Foz' the matu.rethinkar oa;n apprehend thing$ more clearly

weri..

and·d,i$tinctly WhO has had fewer prejudioes, or who has succeeded
in

riddi:nr~ his
~)
[rr] he
11

ltl$ll1orjt o£ them ..

16

third cause is that

01..lX'

ntnd !atigue.s itself when

it applies 1ta attention to the objects which erellot presen.t $.0
the $ens~a .. n 17
iU.

I

' . .,

Il:he

mind caru.tot atter::.d toarry object for arry

q If

llj-'1"'k'd

tr~;~~, • , p.

15:Q)iS·
16Ib.!:d.
l?f.b~d, ..

251.
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length ot tue without suttering pain and fatigue.
true about any object. it is even

If tv-!s is

.or. true about objects which

are not present to tke senses or imagination. 18

Thus it happens 'that lIan.'Y e.re unable

1;0

conceive

ar~

8ub-

a"tia.'I'loe'W'll.es_ it is Qerporeal or imaginable, and ."..nsenslble,
althQugh thel"e are many objeot. thav are 1nt.elli.g1b.le which are
not imaginable.

And

$0

they ar$ persuaded that there 1$ no boq

But since

which 1$ not sensible:.

W8

perceive no object su.ch aa

i.t 18 by smse 8loIUl~ bUt- only by reason exeroised upon sensible

objects, it happEl'lU\ that the majority of

m~

peceive nothing ell:"

cep 1%1 a contused manner. 19
4)~.

which

4.0

tounh

18 that . . attach our concepts to woms

ca11$$

not aOO'U1'atel,.

8lUJ'W$J;t.

to the real! ty. "20

speak ftat1iaoh all ou» conoeptions to words which

In Q.rder to
~re$s

them,

an4 ··comm1t to memo17 tbought. in aonn$",t1on with the$& words.

Lat.,r on we find it Hsier 1;0

s1gn1t1e4 by thtut t

.an4

$0

~$Oall

the word$ than. th.ethinga

cBnoonoeiVEl) notr.J.ng we ooncei f t 1d.th

vbat.; 41st1netness necessBll'.Y to aepuate w.hat

woX!de u.s.a. to
attend

expJNtS$

~o WO~8

our conoeptions.

rather than to things, and oontent

18;t9t1d•

19t:l!ara·
21Thid ..

oono&:I.:". from the

:f?or this reason,

aas~t to terlns without knowing ,just exactly

aoikw:",

\'1$

p. 252.

many

~be$selves

what they mean. 21

to

•

23
We shall sea in the next chapter that we err when the will
passes judgment on some thins that is not olear.ly and distinctly
perceived.

And the tact that something is not olearly and d1s-

tinotl,. perce! ved result$ from the four reasons tlOt. above_

Ti'or this reason, the1"8f'ore, we can designate thes$ four factors
as the tour main rel!1ote sources Qf

~or.

But clearly, these

four remote sourcas would have no immediate e1' feet were there no
~oxima.te

causes Of'

error.

~Vhell

Desoartes $xam.1nes &rror more

o.10.$e1,.. he tells us that it arises from two jointeauses, tithe

facu.lty of knowing •

it

and the faeulty of choice, or rathar

•

ot

frea will.,.22
Let us oonsider first the faculty of knowing-the undel'st'anCU. ng..

It

[I!/"

the underata.ndr:tng alone (I ne1 thel-

as.en

nor

detlT an:y1;h1ng. but)!? I oIl.ly conceive the ideas of th1ngs wtd.eh

I awi;1 assert or deny.

pr~ieely)24 oan we

Nor (in oonsidering the u.nderstandiJ1g thu

$&y

that; 8l'lJ"

In the l.l.4M!»i,8 he tells

U8

erro~ 1* ever touri1 in 1t.,.25

the part played b7 the underatalld1ll@

when he $8.78: "I a.dmit that we can 3udge of nothing unless our
t

I

22u~&,a!1!Bth LaFleur. p., 5<). I'ta tacul"tate coposeendi •••
a tac,ulire eIgeIidi aiva ab arbi trii Ubertat~h ft !.!A.ll. A" f., t

VII. 56.

2~The clause

tti8

nJasseure ~

not found in the orig1na.l Latin.

Xl$

( Of.

nie auoune chOEH~1 mUs" is
I.d... lIt A. T.. t Vii. 45«)

24Th• phraa$ "en 1. (entendement) eons1derant ansi presle$'ment tl is nnt found in the original Latin. (Of. 1})111,")
25Jli!41!A!iQS!, LaFleur, P.. ;0.

24

ers'tand1ng is .made use of, because there is no rea.son to.up-"
ose we can juQ.gEJot what". in no 'ldse appx-ehend .. "26

The c1udg-

see in our next point t 1s plaeed by the will.

thus the understanding
in .%TOr.

ha$

a minor; though necessary role to

It baa no &4tive part to play, but 1s a passive

tn'PlA,.,..w..ul.si'tie 1nso far as the will passes judgment on, what the

.•retanding perceivea. obscurel,..
What t then, is the role of the will in error?

let

11S

COnsider the nat'Ul."e of the will.

In

Bw! first at

com~1sQn

with

h. understanding, this ftteul11y is i._neely greater thtm the

im1tfl4 unde.;ostanditng. 27

.. ( [~IS a _tt.l' of tact )26 I a~rt.nQ.

(it. to be so ~pl•.e:ndmended)29 that; t.hen are no l11lJ.1ta whieh

reatr1ct it ••:;0 i'U:r:'tmer on. 1n this part ot M:~.tlt~oiu.a.r.t;a
e.tih)~.

"F.~

d..fines

tn.

nature of the will in the following mannert

it consist. only tn the .tact that "

e:an (make a choice; we

can);;l do a given thing oX' not do 1t~that 18 to say,
ira or 4_1'17. pureue or &'Vo14.

O~

we

can. a.f'-

more properly. our frae will

~82ldan. and Ross, p~ 233.,

27f~"t$'$.toYt LaFleur,

p.

51.

28Th, phra.. ,. Enl. ef'tet U is not found in the or1gi.nal Latin.
(0£. 1!!l- !I. A.T •• lX, 45 .. )

..

29~~ .ords »1(e) s1 vague & s1 enteXldue'· are not found in
./

the orlg1nal Latin~

(Ct. Ibid.)

30!!4iif.t10nl. LaFleur~

Pi 51.

31The phrase t.tfa,i.re une QAQse lt is not :found in the ol.'ig1nal
Lat1tL. (Ot. Mf4. II, A.T. t IX, 46.)
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consists only in the rut that in a£ :firming

or denying, pursuing

Qr avoiding the ttdngs suggested b7 the understanding, we behave

in such

9. ~.

that we do not teel. t.hat

~

external. :toree has

const'raill1itd our deoision. n ,2
However, $.1nc.e the POwel:' ot wi.Uing comes from God t and

sinn. it is perfeat in it. own right, Descartes

~gu•• "~t

the

ea.us. o.f m:y errors 1s not tile power ot willing (oonsidered by ito-

saUl. '3d 34 And tor th.same reason the und'$rstanding is u.ot
the. callse ot error ,,,hen 1. t 1s considered in 1. tsel.t. 35 FQ~ even
1;hough the understanding is llmited in its range, i11 is perfect

th1a respect that flever:yth1ng
. . I ocnceive I eonc.iV$ properly.

in,

.

and· it 1s.~ posaible tor •• to be uceived in that res:peet.,,;6

Sinoeem.'Or du.s fiot a.r1n .from the w1l1. norfwm th$ poweJ
of eoac.e1V1ngt considered in 1:thciml$elves, Deseartes logically

uk$ ll1muU whe 4luu.t1Qnt lfWbenee. then, do ln7 errors U1se,?··'?
And· tbe . - r that
Ii.flf>ont the
L

.1

~i.tel\r

follows 1s that erl"Or arises

fact that the will is (m.uch):;a more ample and farII

an ,

~ME;t.u.Raf' LaFleur,

p. .51.

"!l'lle llhrase
flpe~ ae apeetatmn ,. is not
(ot.!!I\_ IIt A.T;;, VII, 58.)

tranala.'t:ion_

f'oundin the French

~!S1t,::r10a.l, LaFleur, p. 52 ..

':;l,!tid,
:56:rp14 •
~7Ib~;.
,8The word "beaueouptt ;J.s not found in the original Latin.
A. T... IX. 46.)

(Ot.. Mad..

n.
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reaching than the understanding, so that I do not restrain. it
within the same limits but ext$ld it even to those things which I

do not understand. It

,9

In the !l'ti;ns.:\;ei! Desoa.rtes oites the same

rea.son for error when he states: tlFurther, the p:Etl!'eept.ion of the
understand.ing only extendS to the few objects which present them.selves to 1 t, and is alftYs very limited.

h.._.

Ifhe will, en the other

1.'flS:Y in some measure· be sa14 to 'be infinite. "

to"

80

that

we-easily extend. it beyond that which we apprellend clearly.
when

And

w. do this there is no wonder if it happens that we are de-

ee-1v$d: • ..40
To sum up what we have said thus .tar on the proximate

callUS

Qf'

error. we can :re1'er to a. seotionol the PrtnpiRia al-

:ready 01 ted l WhceN Vie f'ou.n4 Deaoartes saying that

U". d.;teots of our mode of action. tt41
us.-, or rather t the misuse.

what is not

elearl~

o~

tf

our errors

The mode ofaetion is the

the ft.ll in making a ;Judgment on . .

and di$t1notly perceived by the un4er-

stand1ng.

There remains one f'inalpo1nt for our Gona1deration, and

that 1.6 to explul1 the manner in whioh Descartes remOVes all
blame tor our

eno~s

from God.

St&.rting the

~edi.1fa!1~ .~~t!

he demonstrates 'h.$ existence of' God, eoncluding: -An4 from the
ill

)

"9lYI.~tat10n!t LaFlellrt

p. 52.

4{)Hal.dane and Ross, p. 233.

41~'bid. t p.. 2;4.,
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very-fact that such an idea
this idea exist" I so

OCQUN

~1dently

in me, or that 1 who posaess

conelude" that God exiats and that

my own existence depends entirely upon him evex-YIDoment of my lite

that I am confident that the human Illindcan]mow nothing with
42
greater evidence and certainty .. n
Due to this l.Ulbounded confidenoe in the absolute certaint:;r of th. providence o£God, Des-

cartes must olearly ex:tablish the fact that G·od. can in :no wise
decaive
God

:r.a.a%l by

causU:tg h.Ln toe,rr.

For, if we so 0.$,1'&00 upon

every m.oment of ou We, the realization

that. God' would. 0.1'

$V$neould. decei... us, would oertainly destroy am::! l'aith in the
prov1d,ence and goodness o£' God.

I f erro,rstelIl.$ from God , wha't-

:t'Ieoourse is lett tor 'the philosopher but
o1:sm1

It God oan deceive

ee:3:ve

U$

in ,an;rth1ng.

t:ha't150111et:P~i.ng

UJih

$ceptioianlo~

.e must eonelude tl::t.at He,

C~

4e-

ThereJ'o,l'$. no matter how oonfid,f>ll't on. is

iseertain, aven i ! one has a clear and.. d.istinot

1d'$" •. he nm,st withhold Ms .tim assent becaulle
~e

agnosti.-

th~

will al-

J,:!'$Illain the fear that the opp,oaite OpitllJ)n may be t.ru.e be-

oause God is decel'rins us"

Insl1ort. a deceiving God W'ouJA. d ....

stroy the validity ot human knowledg•• 43
lop this reason we find Descartes 8iving a number ot rea....

sons vlAyGod is

ElJtCllS-.

from oausi:ng

OUJ."

errorlt..

.JH.~Bt

of a.ll.

hegl;.ves a. metaphysical argument showing that ileceit is repug:Seaondl:r~

nani; tic God.
#.

I

he excuses God for giving us

,

42~edi,la:~~ons ,LaIl'leur, pp. 47-48.
43Ibid"

p. 32.

8.

will and

tu:lAarstanding that are not absolutely :perfect.

And thirdly t he

shows that the mll el;'t'$. not in so taX' as it comes frob' God t
but in so far as it is miaused by
First ot a.ll. then.

that God

Ca.tlllOt

deceive

tOl:"

US:.

the metapbysiealargument showing

rtFor first t I recpgnl.ze that it is

US'.

impossible tor God ever to deceive m.e, sinae in all fraud an.d
de~ption

there ia some kiM of imperi:eet1on.

1uld although it

seems that to be able to dee-ai Va i.8 a mark ot (acumen,)44 (sub-

tlt1i~.)45 or p4)~. neverthel~ss to wish to deceive tastifies
withoui;question to we~$sor malice, which could not be tound.
i:nGod. lf46 Much the eam. argument isoftered in the ~ngipia.,
JtTh~tirst

ot (led· s Utributes Whiell talls to be, eorundered here

1sthat ne is absolute13 true and the souroe

0:£

all light t so

that it is evidently a Qontre.d.ietion that lie sh,Quld deeeive us.

tha:i 18 to say that He should b'$ properly and posi tiv$ly the
oaUM ot the errors to \It.deh we are consoious of being subject.
For although the oapae1ty!or

d~$it

would seem to be a. mark at"

subtlety ot mind amongst m.an, ;.ret thew111 'bodeceive p.rQceeda
on.).y;t,rom malice .. or fear. or weaknEf.ss" and iV cannot eonseJ

'11] It.•f.

i r

t

4+ The word ftacu:min1sff is not found in the Frencb translation •.
(Ot:. Med. IV, A. T•• VII f 5.3·.)

45 Th• 'from "subt11it-e't is not .found in the· original Latin tt ·
(Ot·.

I&... ll.

A.1'~. IX. 43.)

46~:~t"'t~qp!. IaF l$ur t

p •.

48 41

29
quently be attributed to

God._4 7

But Descartes' absolute faith in

G¢d

seems to be at least

weakened by the tact that; we have everythl1l3 from God., and that
our 1'awlti.esdo aotually err.

TMs

b~ings

us to his second ar-

Since &rror is a privation 1 we might wonder why' God has

gument.

not given our faeult1&$ all that is d.ue to tihem.
f$'nde4 1.n this tnatter in two wa;ys.

God i.8 de-

First ot" all, we simply can-

not understand why God does what he does. 48

And this lack of an

Ul3:d(tz.stanc11:ng of God's ways should not lessen our faith in Hirr,,_
SMondly. we

$h()uldoonside~

the p"'l'eetion of creation as a

Whol.. for what apllt'U$ to be an iL1pert.eid.on in an individual
ele_~t dOe$

not appear

m~rteet

when. considered as a part

or

the Ylbole of clteat1on.'+9
" • •hould not oomplain beeause God has not given us an

n.

'tlll*

d&ntand1ng that is unlinrl:te4 and a will that is u.nerrir..g.
RatheiT'

us

~,

shau14 be'gfttiefUl for tho good things Rehasgranttttd

not

co~plainthat

He does

no~

bestow from His bounty all

that we knew He might have diSP$I1S$d._50
al"~t:

tf

He adds one turther

And a1 though God has n,ot given us an understanding

whtcm 1s omnipotent, Vie must not

£01'

that reason consider that

4?lia.ldane and RQss. p. 231 •

. . 48..1D:!i12ai, !&Fleur. pp. 49-50.
49i}ii~f1., p. 50.
50Ha.idane and" Ross, p.. 234.

Reia

th~

o.r1.ginatoro:t our errors.

For all ereated.'t.lll'Uier-

standil:)g i.s finite, and it is of 'the nature of t:in1te~der

stand:ing not to embraoe all things. ~51

And t:1nally, ]}esca.t1ies argues that
God

.a.n.(l. noth11"lgn~Bs t

that 1s, so pla¢ed

h~

is "a mean betw.en

bet\V~Uln

the supreme

Be1:pgand non.-being that, in sO .tar as a supreme Being hail pro-

duced me, there 1s truly nothing .in me which could lead. me into

error; but i f I consider myself as somehow par'b1el.'pati!l6 in
notiliingness

Ql'

non-being, that ls,

11'160

far as :r am. net m;yseU'

the supreme being (and am. lacking many thingS.) t 52 (I find myseU

exposed to sa intin1 tyof detects,

that )53 I sllmild not' be

$0

ast'onished if I go wrong.• »54

There are, of course, two W8;1s in whioh God could m.ake us

ttnal>le to

o~,

and yet eJ.low us our

.t~edom..

-He migllt,

£.0'11' .$%-

NIlpl.•.t have @.i1venmy understand:l~ a clear a.nd di$t1net eom.p~

Attnsion

ate."';'

ot all the tl:.inge about whioh I should ever dellb$l!BUt el&all'ly, God. bas not done thiS, nor did He haVe to

do t t.,But bhere is another way He m.ight have helped

51a l.51 .,

ll16

so that

p-. 23? ..

52TheVlOrda Udesuntque mibi qU8.:1:plurima tl are not found in
the Fnnch translation. (Ct.~. IV. A.T., VII, 54.)
/

I

/

5~The words If is me trcmue expose a une in.tinite de manquemens, de f'a~on que" are not fouv.d in theorlginal Latin. (ot.
Me4. lIt A.'f., IX. 43.)

54f;ieCt:+'ifl;tion,st I.laFleur. pl 49.

5'Ib:id. t p. 55.
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r would be less s,l1sceptible to error. tor !the

migllt simply have

e:n.graved so deeply in rq memory thf;t resolution never to pass

judgment on at'q'tt..1ng without conee! v1ng it clearly and distinotlJ
that I could nsve.l' torget tUs rul~., 1156

Although. God Himsel!, ha.S

not 1.mpres,sed this rule on my mem.o1'7. still this mtm1ler ot
avoi,ding erro:r is within DO' grasp.

I can, by

reso~v1ng

never to

judge Without a clear and j1stinct 1a.ea, aequire the habit of :001

errillg.57

.ana:
W$

For every clear and dietinct 1d,ea is someth,ing real

positive, thus hav1.ng its origin from God, "and consequently

must conclude that such a conc.ption .. " .. is true. n58

fore, it I

~u4ge

fh,ero-

only where the idea is perceived by my under-

stand1ng olear ly and distinetly,. 1. shall nev&l."' err. 59
.And so, not only can we ...,. that God is not the Qa.u.se of
()u:s.".r~mJ,

but also that He has given us everything needed for

a eonec'b LTJd true judgment.

Theelaments !l(i)oeasary tor a true

judgment are a ole:u' and distinct ld$:a, en understandi..'l'l.g that
cl.early and distinotl:y pareei ves, and a will that treely arf1-l."m.IIJ

or denies.

And even, when we do not have a clear and distinct
idea, the will is never forced to make a judgment. 60 The willii

-

56xb.1d.
57Ibid.•

58.Ib,~p..... p_ 56.

59aa.ldane and £loss, pp. 231, 232.
60MM1 j;at!OnE!,t LaFleur,

1>;),.

51.
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a.lways free to withhold its

aSSfJn t. 61

In conelusion. theret'ore, we find that Descart,e.s ha.s explained error by saying that it is caused by t1'U:1 vrlll in an act

ot affirming or denying wha.t is net olearly perceived
Although God has given us these

understa."1ding.
n

which in eOn.juRtlon

ea.u~e

"CWO

by the

faculties,

error, He is in no way e;u:tltr ot

causin.g our errors t because in themselves these faculties cannot~Qwrong,

mal~e

and becau3e error is not a real thing, w:t-deh would.

it depe:n.dent on God, but a privation, which f!.lp...kes it depend....

ont QIlourselves alone,.

a

V1a::!

It is only wlle:n we use our .faculties. in

not L'1tended by the Creator that we fall into error •

t.b:us explai.'t!..i:ng the prox1r.uate cans'as and

natur~

of

errol.~

By

Des-

carte:$ has sat1a.tied himself that G()d is in no way the cau.sa o£

6lualdane and Hoss.. Pl'. 232 t 2}4 ~

CHAPTER III

THE WILL,

UNDmUJTAN.DIl~G,

A?m JUDGMENT

ACOORDING TO DESCARTES
In the previous ohapter we exa.m.ined De.soal"tes· doctrine on
error in genera.l and disoovered that error

oUJ:$elve$~and not ~l'.J.ng Ha.l l caused
from an

1nte,rpl.~

or

detect caused by

by God..

It results

the understanding and the will in judgment.

But in what we have seen oJ:
19.1l$U?~

iSti

erm ?N!).

f,~~1ta!r10

Qu.arta and fl:!neip1a Phi-

Des(lart$$ 1s not al~s expllc1 t abcut

theeuot nature of the Will, understanding, and judgment.

He

ha. WIled these concepts, but he does not always elCpla1n them,

. . .pt in a

V9r'Y'

g$neral way.

Therefore!t it will be necessary

ttl) anaqze these no't10llS mo:re oarefully, taking the material tor
o~enal~s1a

.tromthe above ment1on:ed works as well as !rOm

o~h....

er pUeage. in his wri t1ng, ..

It will be
, i

J.,

I

~

neclessa~

to consider not only the

two

faculties

ot _11 Ind Ullderetedillc.

_t

J4
d_ the act ot Judg11l8fa1ne_

1;1':11. 1880 1ntiuteq .,llnHt$4 wl_ h;ls dootrlu oJ:
tdl'l.oe .nor 18'1 .b14"~ 1n 1J:he $u4pat: a10ne:.
~

1a h
ab.le
8nd

1)0.

1J.iUll7M fiI"$'"

proc..a.to

~.n

co'-derat'io.
•••
,0£'

~

MOO~

Wil.l.

~.

toD••~••• 111

tn. ull

t.nJ%'

~md _~h

w1.1~

btr meN pt-of1t-

i:t 'the undel."'.1ulm41ng,

u.o4.H'a.n41nc .. 1f111

F~

be

OU'

.a. ...

he p1.... j.Ud-.-t in the ·.11 aM )tet in the .'tile.. _ ••

thot18ht • • •

mU.ns.

~• • •

;A.pln.u in tn.

~.tw.Oha,'pt_

. . . ahUlatt.:mpt, as

M pou1:bl.e* . , __an 1a • • .Nala of Dee• •t ... ~....
~..,

8Al

Be4aua$ ;J~-'

di ••u8.en. of t11. ;jw.tpent.

th. wtl1 :cw4

~or,

of 1 . ftl,1.ti't7J1<

ire .$'ball.

:&i.'.h....

b

tUa , . . .

on the ••" , . at

h_eve~

_sort to

..

~.~

t:b.e,. oan sit_ _._ USh'

~.

eh.u.-. t

1$..

~.rt

t~pt,

;tu

__

Wlll.

.a l.Ude.t...oUll.g

a~~

the two

s-_-l . . .a tnthe OUl••ta 4onr1neO'.t t~t.2 50 ,.hapa
1tM*.U "lHtt• •

1Alatt.t tM

_41~ biB Mi,dOJ1

~41.'"not:tGa ~Oft . .

or

thought and the· M.-

dieeu.. the \flU ad

. . . . . . . . .1,ng t;h•••lv• •
~

J._o.t41llg

of all, then, wb..:, 414 Dasoaft•• mean b7
",0 Jut.oombe an(\

:trench ot th.
) u;

'p,

11._."

aeac:n,

~u_thcen~

1141111 II. d I ......

the woRd

"th(1)~h1r·?

/

imqlti i.n evexo;r4a:y

.ha4 • w1der .,pliefltion than

nlode::cn

Fre~

It was natural tl':l.:Em., though. not now, to re.fer to
".

an emotion as !m! MH.!e..

Likewise, the word. ?Ogi

tw

been used by philosophioal La:tin in the wide sense.

bad long

For example,

!!S11at!Ct}l!i e9rpiwn 1n St. Thomas covered all internal states
of' the

m1.n4.'

But the l!b:lgl:Lsh

leotual oonnotation.

w'u.~

u'though1;ft has a plledoUdnan1tly intral-

The1'efore. to tJ.'ansla.t$

!!S;!?UI an«

i!aiU

by the WON Bthought" would be ,1'Ving Deseanes· doottrin. an :in-

teUectual oast that was not int$'l.ded
nt;he

words

$l33 ms

the author.4

How."..».

and tlh99.ih~ \\'1.11 sometimes dOl £01: e-ample. 1n

the it!OiU1••• render "a au! iSa2

tl\llJ.l2D

by

Iml~

J.t.

~ by

1. s.

!iM~

b$caus. 1'.\.8. the _ . , . involved, be-1ng an act

of doubt1:tlfh .Nall7 is a thoUSht. ill the ol:d.ina.ry sense.

W. have

hOW. . ..t'tQt't«:t found

it alrlaa.ble to use more geneJ:'al term•• auch

u'tl$ noun and veb

'mSlixS

B7 the

tU'lll

an.d the adJeot1v$ oon$01ous.,tt5

PlUS;!;tl~lC) Des4urteunderstan4s all t;hat we ue

c,oQc1ous of as opera:1rins is us.

~er$fore t

this wid. use of

o.r mYM will includ.e not only un4e.rstfW4:hag.
~nat1on, 'but also :.e•• ling and emotion.6

Q;oA'd.1tat10
and

willing.

There 1s no doubl1:ln Dellctl1"tes' :mind that he aet.lly has

3Rene D.$Ca.rteatP~$o.,* W~~t.\ffh &de..
. t p.
V !.

scomb. and Geaoh (Edin15u.,

~~i$.
'ibid•• p. xlviii.
Gpr1nf.l1'Pia:, A.T., VIJ.l j 7.

& trans.

An-

....

thoughts, that he thinks, .ince thi8 :1.$ the firstindub1table
conclusion which occurs to anyone philQsophizing in a.norde,rl;r

manner.? ~ought is ths:e$senee o.tthe thinking seU or
and we lm.ow 'the mind more clearly than anything elae.

mnd,

Fora

substanoe is known more ale8J.."l,. in proportion to the number of
quali'ties we Uscern in that $Ubstanc&.

But all

tho..

operations

.of the mind. $ueh as unclerstanding, w1111ng. imagining, 1l'Ml1ng.

eto_, are qualities 01 thought t though Descartes Use$ the apeGille 'tferm "mode" tor the generio tex-Bt "quality."

And since

we

.lalOwof more qu.e.llt1ea o.t the mind 'than of the body, the mind ia

bett4l~ ~ than the bodY-irS
Further on in the

~~!il

»••eartes

is more explicit eon..,.

C$rning the division of his oonscious e:itperlenc8, for he elas....

s1l1e. t'he m.od$$ o.t thought into two general classes, of whioh

one is tl:te mode ot

p&l"-oept1on

the rAC:de of volition (Will).

(tUlderstanding) .fU1d the othel'

Sensang, imagining, and pexocutlving

ar4l ditte-Z'ent modes of the und.btanding..

Des1.ring t bei,Ii.gawa.re.

a!.fi.t'lrdng. de:n;ring. and doubting are different modes ot willing.9

And this brings us to the discussion ot the mod$l tistino-

Ao.o,orQ.1.ng to Descartest a substsnee is that wldch. is o£

ti<>n..

it~lftlO
4

j)1

r

f I ,

1thile an at'bribu1fe 1s that 'which 1s imperfectly di.a-

iI,

7I~4 ••
S

.;Ii

P. 8.

Xb~.

91:2:1.4.. p. 17.

tinot from the substanoe, that is. we can tb1nk of one without
thinking o£ theother.

But a mode is that which is dlstinctfrom

substance in such a VIIs::! that substanoe is perfectly distinct from.
the mode. although the mode is only imperfectly distinct trom
subst@ce.

For example. one can think o£ $ubstanoe (corporeal)

vdthout tbillking ot motion

(mod~),

although one eannot think of

motion Without at. the aue tim. thin1d.ng of substano4h;ll Applying
thi.•. modal distinction to the thinking substance., th.e mind. 12 we
find that we

C.a:n

think: of the mind without thinking

or

either the

will or the Ulldtu.'eta.nding, but we cannot tlUnk of eitheX' the will

or UJ:l4er$te.nd1:ng without thinld.ng of the mind. 1;

Th1S111odal distinction 1a quite convenient tor

D~.cartest

s:Lll¢e it helpe h.im explain how the understanding and will, which
Ut.'

two quite

g~j_pent.

(tiV'~r$e

.faculties, can cooperate to pertomasln-

Although we oan think of the understanding without

t.bLZlld.n.g of the will t and viC$ versa. t we can

thinko~.

lle1 tIler

without thinld.n.g of a eGmmon .lement, the miIld" 14A.tl.d sinoe what

.lO.b1~..

ll~.'i!'

p. 24.
p,.

29.

12itaubata.n.ti8., cui !nest immediate cogitatio, vocatur I~J.ep,$ .. ft

Objectiones

~,

A.T., VII, 161.

13·~.
.
.W#ino.·,
p. 29 •

. '. 14~ ~rJ4 for Descartes is a simple subetanoe,that is. a
su,bjeet (substance) l.rl whioh we oomprehend only thougb.t (attribute) with the various m.'Odes of thought (in general,the will
and
in E£2~t A.. T", VIII t 3,50351. the und$%'stand1ng). INotae
,_

.-.

is clearly and distinetl;y thought, exists as it is thought, we

conclude tor Deseartes that the will and understanding, be-

O!:ln

cause the:r are thought of as en sting together, aotually do exist together.

it would seem that fox' Desca.rtes these

Thererore~

two taculties,one ot which is superior in both :-ansa and dig....
nity to the other, 15 oan work together quite easily.

Thiswa

propose as one possible help for DesctU"'tes sinoe be d.oes not are;u,G in this ntruu'le:r it.

As a matter of fact t he does not seem to

giva any effective answer to the question of how the will and
understanding \fOrk together. 16
Now that ive have sean the general analysi til of the mind 1nt(J
its a.ttribute (thought) and modes, let us. first or all, cons1d,rthe mode of thought c.all.e4 the will.

We shall eonsider

thcl existenoe of the will; and its nat't.U:'e : as a power of a.ft'1.rm1ng and denying, tiS a perfeot power. and as an unlimited
poweXOll
D~soe.rtes

does no'b spend much time proving tbat we aotuall.y

hay. a will and the. t i t is free. 17

In the :P;t'inciRi,a he tells us

ftthat we possess a Free-Will which eauses us to abstain from
givitt8 a,.sent to du.bious things, and thus prevents our tailing
I' "._

j

I!

15~!4 .. lIt

A.IJ:I., VII'f 56-'7.

-m. S~die~ 2:.!! !!:!
. JfhilosOlZ& 2! Descartes

16N• K • Smith, li'ew
(London." 1952). P.

l7lt is to be noted that Desoartes melees no diat1.nction b ....
t\Veell the will and .free will. He uses these two notions synonym

I!"""'.

~9

into error. tllS

HEt does not prove this assertion, but, rather,

assumes that it is a self-evident truth.
~ent

ItFinally, it is so &vi-

that wa are possessed ot a free will that can give at' w1:th-

hold its assent. that this may be oounted as one of the first and
most ordinary notio:l:ls tha:t are found innately in us. ,,19
argum.ent he o£:ters for this sta.tement is that

when~

The

in his pro-

cess. of methodioal doubt, he eVen 8uppoa;ed that God weJ.". det;;uuv:Lng him. still he had the liberty to abate.in from beli.ev1ng

lWh!l1r was notcleuan4 M8t1nct .. 20
We see above that wilen nesoe..rte. is assertixlg the exi.&tenc8

of l1lle will, he is alsl) deiinilne; its natur. as a. pow.er of 11£.fir.minS' and (i6D.:yi.ng.
nc.Qllsists only in
~u., 0;;0
rt.h~

avoid..

In

filM:i:trat~o

iuvta

he states that the will

the .fact that \VeGan . . . . a.!'fil't1l oX" deny, pur-

Or more pX'oparly, our free will consiats only in

tact that ill a.t:t'irmil1g or denyillg. pursuing or avo;idingthe

rthing$ $uggest,f!.Id by the undel?Standing, we behave in such a

rtn,at we

do

ws::r

not feel that; a.ny external torae has Q01l$i;rained us

fi.n our d.,dSion.n21
Thus the faculty of willing consi eta in the power ot af~i$ing

or denying what is presented by the UlldElrstanUng, witb.-

181ialdane an,l l{oas t p. 221.

19.0 &&_, p.

234.

2°f.r~~, A.. T., VIII, 19-20.
21fldibtat.2.?lfiii t LaFleur., p. 51.
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a.n:r external compulsion. But to be tree does not m.ea.n that

out

$.l.'s necessarily indifferent,

'Tie

£0:£'

one of two eont:t:'8.ries. the freer

W'e

the m.ore 'fie are inclined to

are.

Tl1is inclination may

(I.-om the faot that one o.f the two contraries contuns more
goodness.. or because (tod is guidJ.. ng m:y min4... 22 .t And certainly f
COIr~e

divine gra(Hl and natur,a.l understa.ndil%" far from diminishing 1Jf3
lib.ert~r,

rather augment and atrengthGl'l it.

iJioreovert t.bat in-

tti.tterence wl'J.eh I teel when lam not more moved toward one side
thtal. thb other by (the w$ight

or )23

SOllle reason 1s th$lowest

degree Gt Uberty, and is rather a detect i.n the unt1ersta.lldi:ng
tha,n

a IHarfeetion ot the will.

11'or it'

r always understood

olearly what is true and what is good, I would never need to delib~a:te

about What judg.ment and what choice I ought

'co

make ..

1 would be e:o.tirtl;,y f:r:.e wi thou t ever being ind1t.f' e.~
en:t:. tt24

and

$C

Alld since indltt&r$nQe is not a perfection. of the will, it

is

~t

ilu'd to

8" wbjr Desoartes

would Glum that indi£teren(.H',

iB uot &ssent1al to h't.'UJl&n lib-$lt'ty.

If

lAl nd

tinally indi.ffere:nee

does not belong to the tlSS$I.lC\l of human liberty, since we are
fN$

not only when out' iguol'anoe ot the right rerlders us :Lndif-

!erent. but alao, and Chiefly, \vhen a olear pereeption impels us
•

".

22~b14.t
4

in.

'I

POll

52.

23:'.1:h$ p~a.s$ ttle poids d. til is not found in th$ original La~
(Ct. Had. !y~ A.T~, IX, 46.)

2i~ita:tiQn~h LaFleur, p. 52 ..

....

41
to proseoute aome de£ini1;$ OourBS ••• 25
This is Descartes' general (ioetr1neo! the nature of l1bert7
0:£ the will as proposed in the :Mlditatioa_!.

But on the matter

of liberty of inditfe:t-.nee there so_a to be a change 1n doctrine

in .bis later wox-b.

In a le'cter to Father Llealand, 1\\87 2* 1644,

he states that tf1 would have you ah&erve that I did IlQt say that
a man ie indifferent only where he lacks knowledge" bu1; rather

,hat he is m.ore indifferent in propon1on as he knows fewer reaaons tor choosing one side mt:ller than the other;
tll:tllk. nobody can deny. ,taG

kind of

l1b~

H.~e

ana this, I

he seems to be admitting

SOla$

of ind11't_.renee.

W. need not go into the lnooted problem of why Desoartes
~e4

b.1s doetrine on tn. will, or more speeif1caUy. on .tre....

dom of in41,tterence.

Aeeording to Keeler: t'G11son' $ theais. that

De.eal'te. had. no Qr:tg1naland. well worked-aut theory

~gllrdin.g

human tretdom, has ~n generally accepted b7 hi.$tor1&lUh J42?
Keel.er then concludes, spesld.ng tor himself: nInth. Meg1 i1a$::1oy

he. speaks as a Tll.omiat, wherea.s in the

J?e:1ne~:.El!~,

a book written

25R.n.D.$cert~,at T~ PA1toso~C;i.~ .~ D!~el'

trans. Haldane and. Ross

amSr

(lg'Eh

(}

)-;-Ir; '249.

26Anseombe and Geach, p .• 289. It is significant to note tha
this l$tter was writ'ten in j,l.q 1) 1644, two months before the publj.
ca.tion ot the .E;mN1R~!' and almost three years atter the publication 01 the MId ~:2.1.011!S. The sentiment expressed in this letter seems to be tEe same notion of freedom of indifference as
that haUl in th. Paat~a~. (Ct. 1?~ •• A.T •• VIII, 17-24.)
"
te

21X..lert pp. 165-l66.... lie 18 referri:t'l6 to Gilson, ¥l M.,1l9J:. z De t.. $ 1
010 iEt Pa.t"1s 191
co. i i i - v i r . -

4.2

a..ft. the outbreak of the JQ.rl$enist oont'rovers;r t and which 'the
authQr hoped to see inl.lrodue.ed into the J esui t oolleges, the tone
is rather that of a. Mollnist t tor whom indit:terenee· is insepara.bl$ from freedom. H28

But since a solution to this problem is not'

essential to our thesis. let us leave the matter in the hands of

thehisiior1.ana.
Getting baok, than. to our discussion of the natureot the
rill, let

1.\S

prooe&don. step furthtr.

\Va find 'that the will,

the. tEr.C.ulty Of affirming or denying,' is not the will that is in a
PUN mind. but is rather thenll
bodied. 29

or

a thinking sel1' that is em-

Therefore. it is intluel'.LCed not only by certain .natu-

ral. imp.luses; but also b,.. talse prejudiced aequiX'ed in early

yea.n._

ThU$ we see how the remote souroes of error t _as. ted of

in tile p"vioua chapter, tind the1.l" applieation here a.s at£ecting
the proximate Gause

ot

el."':t'Ol:',

the. will.

It is alaothe nature of the will, a.ocording to Desoartes,

to be pe,rfect and unlimited.

And us. matter of

fact, it is per-

lectin its freedom precisely because it is unlimited, that 1s,
withbut limit's whioh restriot it. 30

It is perfect, and. indeed.

the onl;rpe1'fect faculty we have; for not.h1ng ela. i.n us is so
perfect or

SO

great that we cannot understand the poss1'bil.1ty ot

28·i.ee~&r. p. 166.

29N• K•

Smith,

~ew?~!St pp., 78, 229.

3OMd1t!ttiOnJ!h LaFleur, p. 51_
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something still more perfeet, still greater.,l

The perfection

ot the understand1:ng, as we shall see, is very-slight and greatl:y
restricted; memol.7' t imagination, and all other raoul ties are also possessed ofa reduced and oireumscr.1bed perfeation.;2

all

Of

the faculties in us. except the will. _ can toa the idea

ot a far greater faculty.

tt~h$r.

is only volition aloa•• (or

the liberty of the will, )3' which I experience to be ·so great in

myself that Ioannot ooncaiva the idea of any otheX"
and)~ e~ten4ed.fl35

.0" (ample

And the 1"$&$on why the will 1$ perfeoti. that it is un-

l.1Jd.ted, that is, th$re ue no l1m1ts to its scope..

assignable l1m.1t to the

re.g. ot

There 1$

1\0

possible af£ir.m.atioDS and de.-

n1a.l., that is t 1n ~ap.ct. to .any propo'Si t10n we can contemplate t
tm.. w.ill e·G a.f'tiril or 4e~. In pRat1ee, pe;r-haps. W& 1ntend to
af't1l:m Only wbat we bel1eve to be
belteve "tso lJ$
de~

tala..

tnUlt and

to derq only what we

But ... also know tl:l.&.t WI' often

~f1l!'ll'l

.and

propos1t:iOll.$i althOugh it is not our wont to affirm and. de-

n:rtb$n capriciously.. 811ill.

;1. t 1,8 wi -bb.in

our power 'to do so.36

3l.;t!~9-.

;2DJ4.•
;;~ worda naive ubltrii liberty*'. ue not t~ in the
:French translation. (Of it !Sf ;IV I A. IJ}. t VII. 57.)
J4.fhe words

(Cflt~.'

n.

It ample €en are not .found in the Latin original.
A.T •• IX, 45.,)

?'~"'tat1()!Yh

LaFl$UX",. p.

36w-aa 1 (

1 'ih.-ll;?

Y\,....

n'!'li.·

51.

In su..mma.ry, th$ll,

C~

analpi.tJ of the will consists in this.

thAt man has a. free will, whose !uncu1on it is to affirm and deny what .1.8 apprehended by the understanding.

And. this tree wi.ll

or pow.rot choioe l.s both perfect and unlimited.
S$Oond.lyt befol:& goi.ng on to see wh;y neeoaJrtes 1$ forced to
' .. ju4.pent an aet of the will and not of the
le~

uaconsidar the understanding in itself'.

t~tWd$r$t"'ding

~• .l'stand1ng,

In our. &n~sis

ot

W$ ahall. d1$~U$$ .ita nature as being pass.ivG.

as being imperfect because 11lJd ted, and yet in some Yl«:fper£ ect.
ahall aee that th1a faoulty

. .'.fhe

un4.,l'$~an41ng

1n l.alDwizlg

~8t.

hass~me

p3!'imacy ovax' tbe

as it were, "pat.iently- con-

~pla:b~Ve.:n'? A. a matte" of .taot, nit ¢annOt invMtf'or 1tseU ... ,lingle nn idea; and be1.ng thus passive in the reoeption
!

~08.

'Which present 'thenu!lelves to it. neither can 1 __ in any

~ mod1t7 or distort tha. M' ~
~tmod1t7
~~'.,ieation

~

Tw.

reason the und$~"a.nd1ng

nOJ: distort thnse ideas. wh1.oh oome to it 3.$ tllat

and di.stortion are actioD$ and the unde:rsta:n41ng is

with th1e emphasis on the :pae$iv1ty

ot the undevatM.d-

.we lIligll.t wel.l ask ourselves the question: Just W'ba.t doe$ the
~....,ratan<.11ng

40?

37N.. X• Snd:th 1

3SIl?~'.

It. is a tacul ty, and, therefore, .,. would ex-

1h 228.

45
Di!sca.rtea answers our inquiry' in M!9:i-

paot it to do something.
~sAA2Sma1i'hen
som~how

h. says that: ftthe m1:04,in oonce1vinfh turns

toward itself and considers some one of the ideas which

1~p08$e.aes in itself ... ;9
'Although the understa:nding can £:veely think or not t1U.nk
1deas,onc's they are thought they eont1'01 and goven the m1nd .. 40
1~

reason :tor this passiVity is because, as Descart.$

~..

"I

do not d.:1st1ngu1sh Qthenis. be'tM"een m1nd end its ideas than be-

men

til

pieoe ot: wax and the 41ft.rent figure. that it

Otitn

re-

e.1ve1 ancl as it 1s not properly an &C'tion. but a pa$8ion in the
wax·'~

rH;eive different

f1.~t

it seems to me that it is alao

a passion :l.n the mind to reo.iv. suoh and such an idea, and th$.t

OXl.l7 ita nlit-lone are· aot1ons. n4~ 1'0%", as

SIH' ·Q\\1.n!~t

he vells us in M!!!1-

"thus, to.t' example ,when I imagine a triangle- ..

even '. t~, there may pema:pe be no such .figure anywhere in the
wo~14

outside of my t.hought, nor ever have been, nevertheless

the tlgu.re eannot help haVing a. eertain d6'terminate nature, or
.foX"Illor essence. wh1.eh is SJrunutable and

.ternal,

wl'..1eh I

ha-..

"9f4.ia.t~ons. LaFlwr, p. 6;" To put this desor!ptlon of
th.. a.Qt'r~lii un'(!8x-stand1ng into context, Des,cU'tes is here
c.parlng it to the act ot imagina.tion, which use convertat ad
eorput at &liquid in eo 1dMe vel a. se il1telleetae vel sensu

peN$pt.ae conforme 1ntuee.:f;ur., It

!t!- It.,

A.. T., VIr. 7'3.

40Normnn Sndth. atu.di~! ~n thl Cut!,aiap. I'b.1l.QSRRel (London. 19(2) ,p~- 109.
'

41~:n14 •• p. lOOt footnote.

(Ot.

~tt.'t AlT., U. 199.)
J

46

not invented and which doea not in a:t1y:.wa:y depend upon my m1:nd ..J4-2
Of oourse, to Ett'plain the fact 'that ideas oontrol and govern the

mind \ Deseart.a must resort" 'to innate ideas. <4·3

ideas ueimplanted in the mind

:i;'hase innate

by God, a:nd t there! ore. the

mind

does niirii haw to torm tha, but simply has to become conscious

otthem .441-

l3esi.d.$sbeing pass!w
cause its range 1$

very liJlli ted.

ean know olearly are lewer
a.tt!1'm ol,'ld.de~. 45

the u.nderstanding 1s upertect t be-

t

by

The things the understanding

tar than the things the will can

Althought;tbe W'Jde"tanding can. con:bfmlplate

ideas olearly .and distinctly, and, therefore. adequately. it con.

template. others. mOM or le.s clearly.

But

as we pointed out in

t:retttlngct the remota $cnu-c·&. of error, ma:o.y men }now only
!u$$117"due to the
tnfUJt· jrEljudioes,

d

"""08.·

'the it1&dequate use of

.f>.

the inabilltar to forget

th$ e&$il$' tir1n8 nature ot the undere tand1 ng"

undetstand el&arly what
do

ot 7outh,

0011-

wo_.~

Though

WEJpec~d.V1t

Vie

desire (_11) to

obecu.rel:;r.f we otten tail to

And al:tihough the 1111.1 can affirm or

de~ ~:pos d.it1ons

I.

'" "I:

4~1t1al8bli"anChe obj&ots to tbJ.s pos'1tion on two oounts: first
it would involve an infinite number of ideas i.n a !ir.t1te mind;

'and $8cotl41y. even i t the mind had stored up in i tseJ..f all these
14• • , it would be impossible to explu.n how it could find those
!tt1llan.·.:tedlt N. Smith, p_ 1091 footnote. (He is referring to
Malflbntnehe t Rasa!~he. p 1\ ;.,0 tf.)

~oad. slIlith.

4~ia.t

P. 109.

AlT. VIII. lB. (lor the dispute betw.een Desaseendi on the 1n.fini tude of the will as opposed to
the limited understanding, ct. Keeler., pp .• 168-169.)

cartes ...
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1~ot

capri.c1ouslYt as it were, it
proposition to be clear.

oapable o~ causing .'"er:1

Henee. to say that the intellect is

limi ted and the will unl1m1 ted without qualification, would be

Perhaps it would be closer to Desean&s' real

misleading.

mean:i ng to $8J" 'that the

un4$~standl.ng

I, power for clear and di.....

tinct ideas is very lim! tGd. alt;hough its povl&r :for knowing, at
least ObsC1l.rely. is much 1$$8 limited.

Al:though the understanding is i.mpfIrfect because it is

Umtte4.it 1$ in I!lloiihar senae no less per:fect tMnthe will.
Eee11112;

tells

'US~

Jt~.tth$\"

are JJU.n)'" thillf$8 "

I$ten¢.yet \'I11a:a we do u.tlde.rstand

o_vl 1 t.

olearl~

cannot under-

U. exactly as we p$r-

ThC'llgh the limitations Of our understanding are me,ny t

in nO' lns'tlulCe 1. underste.nd1ne; tdsceptive* or positively misleadj.ns in 1ts d.1"1.8U.~8.·46

In other WOMS, theunde·rstandin
ot'~_U cannot lI'lfI.ke mistH•• 47 This 1s true tor three rea-

s()'cs.

First of all t th& 'U.nd.e.ratanding is men.1y passive and.
po_~

o.pt1vet %lot havi.t.lg the

clfJUt and dist1.nct ideas
wh~ev$r

~e

soe, th.re is no $rror
GO$$'Sintc> play.

l'

11

ae$Ondl~,

4.1l

ot their ver:r nature 1:irae; and so t

the understanding reoei V$$ a Q,letU" and distinct idea t

it!._ incapable of .nw.king e.

r t

'to falsify id.eas.

N-

mj.stakEh

~rm8take

in .judgment uni#il the will

Oonf'Usad ideas, -as we shall also see, can b$

't

46~ll~tP.• 157.
41!!l_
j.",T., VII. 56~

n.

An4 thirdly, a.s we shall

48
calledmatertally false, but these is no formal falsity until
the ;judgmEmt affirms or

d.nies~

But no ma'tter how clear or ob-

scure the ideas, as long 'as the understanding is content simply
to contemplate these ideas, there is no danger of error. 4-8

That

iete 8a7, merely knOwillg 1d.eu will-n.ever involve formal £a1s1-

"t7.
Even though, in thct 6X'dinal.'7 sense ot Cartesian

e'Pist~-·

mo 10 [(Y , 1;he Understanding 113 imperfeot t and the vl111 perfect,

stiU the Wlderatand:i.ng has a certain prirraoy over the will.
~ord1ngto

1,0-

Deeeartes mtm f $ will is most perfedt and most free

when it ju.d.g$. on

tt

olear and distinot idea.

'·For if I

al~$

cle@l:y understood. what is true and What is good, I wouldnevel'
n~

to deliberate about what· judgmfmt and. what choice I ought

toma.. , and

80

dilfuent. tt49

I \vould be entirely tree \fithout ever being 1nThis doetr1rie 1s expressed by N.K. Smith in the

t:ollO'W1ng manner: "In man the intellect bas primacy o:v$:r the
will,).. it 1.s onl,.in proportion as the!} true and the good are preftr.d.ently tJ.pprehe-nded that the human will can aohieve freedom of

act1oJl. ,150

On the other hand. we can misuse our freedom by

judging on what 1s not

clear~

the will judges correotly
r

I

01'"

enouf!)l ullderstood.

But whetl1ar

not t the ideas must .first be per-

I

~$ling, Pit 158. (Ct. P£ine.,
49~!S1;tfa~on" LaFleur, p. 52.
501f•K• Bm1th. p. 268.

.A.T •• VIII,

9.)
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oeiV$d ;51 and in this Bense the' understanding has pr1maey over
the will.•

Thus we see that the understanding 18 passive,

iP.lpe~f'ect,

and llmited; while the will is active, Jler.teet t and unllmit$d..

Ma.haf,ty compares the two faculties: ItOur understanding is !ini te

.. ,,. • Ou.:t- will is rash. II 52
Flnall:y let us turn our atteuti.on to the ju.dgment.

:For

'V8.rioua reaaons i).$cartee claiIils that judgment is in the will.,

K.e~.J:' enu.me:ratEul four of these reasons :53 First of all, the
undentandiD6 is a pu:t'$l;r passive taeult7 whose only dut::r it 1$

to re:ceive ideu.

Therefore, all the act1vitiss of the soul be-

long to the will., 54 end not to the' understanding.

For th1$ rea-

son (judputnt. whioh is obnousq an action, belonss to the will.
s.o.~.

a

ju.d.pent ia ottenb.&. Which implies the operation of

~l'aoulty.

th$ wi-U.

fh.adly. jutigment Dl:a;r be fale.,

Wh-.- .here is no talsity in the uooerstanting.56
.~

An4 finally,

on the assumption that the will ;judges can one recono.11e

&non with the divi.J::le. verQoi~.,57 For it the unde:rs1ian41ng t
51fD-nS •• A.T. VIII, 18.
52,J,p. Mahaffy, Des2Ht•• (London,. 1901), p. 170.

53Keeler. p. 163.
54Letter to P. Mesland .. A",T., Iil, 113.

55Keeler, p_ 16;,
56!t4- JX, A. T• ., VII ~ 56.
57 Keeler t P_ 16~.

wbich is passive, were to
cQuldnot be

ill

~udg.

flftOneOl1sl;r, the eau.$. of error

itsell t since ii? is ,passive.

oause 01" the error would be something
standing, eith$:r God or, the will.

~.~

Tbere£o~.

the

to the under-

Descarte. rules out the ti,rst

posaib1.1it-y 1mrn.u.a.teJly. The a.ooM po,ssibill1;y. namely, t:b..at

the will causes the intellect to e1'l:', canllot be gre.nte4 by Descartes e.ither.

"1£ the intellect be 'conceived on the analogy O£'

a :piece at

t1:.tat pUs1vely receives irup.-essious. Or Ofa

'\flU.

m1n»r that re:fle-ets more or 1&$$ di$t1nctly such ideas a.s come
betore it. then it is 1nee.pa.b,le Qf torming a synthesis

o~

ideas,

lEtt al.one prOnouncing it ilo be true or talse t a:ud 1teould not.
consequently, exere!se .UGh

powe~

at 1ihe behest of the will.

cQ\l.ldHe links betwe.$ll. ideas, but not ,comm:n&,t

'.,llBtJiWji&!m-.

I

.!l 5!1yid,Sp,.

posit some.tning as exi.sting in thillg'e • .,58

And 80,. if th$ utlders1.7.anding ean malte an erroneous ;judpent

na1th.r

beo.au~}e

of itsel.t nor becal1se 'Or sor,}etlU.ng els6, we can

only-oonclude that the undeX'standil'lg does not judge.
~heref ore,
l~

him

t~

Descartes t theol:'7 of the human mincl inevitable

the oonolusion 1J:hat the wi.ll judges.

But although

it is 'bhe will that judges t wed..o not imp17 that the uud.er...
stend1ng plays no part.

For the will must t obViously ~ l'lave

a~thing to ~udg. a.bo1.1t*'9 ~ judgment. therefore, consists

58I1!1d. (01'. !a., lIt A.T. VII, 57.)
5~H •• A.T., VIII, 18.
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in an interplay between the understandi ng and the will t the 18.ttel" faculty actuallydo1ng the af.f'irmill8a.nd denying..

The under--

standing furnishes the ideas, which are merely subjeotive appearances 1.n the mind.

Betore these a.ppearance.s can bGCome know-

ledge the will must intervene and interpose that objeotive real1. ty which the ideas

ot themaelves do not possess., In brief.. the

undeotanding alone coneeives; the

vvil~

aloue af.fima or denies ..

T.h,e judgment is different from the underst-and1ng. which

gives immediate awareness. and this d1t1erenoe 1>& due to the
presence in judgment Q! an .w9~d aJA121iW; 4

60

!iiliJ.!! is p:reeisely an attirmation or denial.

and this I!ig~
liowever, we must

not suppose that .this ju4gm.ent presupposes complete cognition.
Descartes tells

USl

ttlfor. in order to

lOX1ll

&n:3 judgment whatever.

is 11; neceasar:r that we should have a pex'feet and entire lmowledge

Qf

a thins; for we Q;ften give our assent to things of

which we have never had any but a ver,y obscure and contused
knowledge .. ,,61
rehus we see that both the will, which 1s infinite,

un11mit~

and perfect, and\the unde~standing, which is limited, passive, and
reoepb1ve, pl9J'" their part in judgment.

Although the idea per-

oe1ved by the understanding is a neeessary component of'judgment. atill, judgment is primarily an act Q£ the will, which
Ji d I. tI

• J

,n HI

~

~. ~ts~t

A"T .. , VII,

'7.

6~ac", A.T •• VIII, 18.
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affirms a.:n4 denies.

It is to be noted that Descartes bas substituted a doctrine
of jude;meIlt with the emphasi.s on the role of the will in atf~ng

or denying. tor a patiently reoeptive and sheerly intel-

leotuaJ.:1st type of intuition as proposed in th.~le. 62

The

rea..on for this al.:l.a.Dge seems to 'be the t8.Ot that V••4artes would

be able to tinA

llO

solution for the p.roblera of

l$ctual intuition and still exonerate God.

SllOth.r reason tor this substitution.,

contact 'With theParls
~l()sQPbW

Oor~egation

erro~1nan

N.K .. Sm.itll oftftl"s

In 1628 Descartes came in

of the Ofttory.

favored by tl:le Oratory was

int$l...

11

As the

1ll0H A.ugustin.i~

than '!'hom....

1st, .e oan e.onjec:ture wi tlt oonside.1"tI1ble probabi11 ty that this
WS;S.

an influence Wi..oh plqed a not unimportant put in fam11i-

art.d.ng De:sGartes with Au.gu.st1:tl1an teaching and thertb71n the

la:t. shaping ot his own utap~sics. t,6,

, J _

@

I .. il!

t.

hl4

62In various places we find Descartes speaking of his intel...
lectual intuition: . ' III, VIII.U, In ~ XII. he
stat$$; It Ad reru."I'1 co . '. Ol1$m dUO tantum SP&ct '. sunt, nos
se1l1cet 1fU.1 cognoscimu.s. &. %'as 1p$ae cognoseendaEh I.n nobis

quatuor sunt facultates tantum. quibus ad hoe uti possimus:
ne:mpe intellectus, ime.ginat10, sensus, 3: memoria. Solus intelleetus equidem percipiendae veritatis est capax .. " Rewae a.d
D1rI4Mi;~ t.OOn1,.i. A. T... X, 4&1.
.
... -

6;.N .. K.

Smith. p.

a~.

011Al?TER IV
mE ROLE O:F TILE WILL IN ERHOR

In the second chapter we presented Descartes t dootrine of

error in a general way It

In the third chapter we

~zed

the

three .fundamental notions neces.sary tor a complete understanding
o£ error. namely. the will, understanding, and judg1l1ent.

In this

latter ·Ohapter we presc1nded, to a oertain extent. trom the
questi,on or error, in order to discuss the nature of these three

notions in themselves.

Now we once again return speelf'1eally to

the p:roblelu of error in order to investigate and present Desoartes' position mi)re tull;r.
cl"1td.,ci$1Il will 'be omitted.

Again,6lS in the previou;s chapters.
And agal.ll..

a.s in the trJ..lX'i ohapter.

we shall make use of various oommentaries which are aVllU.lable on
De~artes'

llotion of the nIl in error whallevfltr they

. But before we dan

s1ve

Q$.n'

help us...

Descartes' complete solution to ex-

ro:c. 1t will first be necessar;y to discuss briefly two other

points! What is truth, aeeoming to Desoartes?
$rto~

And. where is

not found?
Truth, aCcOording to Descartes. is "e. sub.jectiv&$ertitude,

-:uhatis true which I cannot h,elp believing. ttl

True knowled.ge

.....
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is assent to what is certain, an*ts truth coincides with its
cartitude *

When I know something with full carti tude t so that I

can neither doubt nor suepect reasons tor doubting, that knowledge is. trttefor me. 2

We saw in the introduction that olear and distinot ideas
are tbAl eri tarion tor truth.

It we have a. clear and distinct

idea of something, that thing is true. 3 It 1. obvious.. then,
fOl: Descartes to conelude: "For the lo.lolfledge u.pon 'flhic.h a car-

tun and incontrovertible ".udgment o,an b. temed, should not
alone be oleaI,' but also d1stin.ct ...4

Be states the sam~ idea in

the t'1.nt rule of logic, whiCh is contained in 'the Disqours.

"The .first rule was ., * .to include nothill6 in JII3' conclus1or...s
'U.1lles$ 1it presented 1tseJ..f

$0

clearly and dis:tinctly to my mind

that 1 had no occUion to 40ubt 1. t

111

n5

. By this he

J\eEmS

that we

m.uat· tlaretully avoid .e.n;s bute or prejudice, and accept as true
only 'Wh.at can be verUled, by on."' .• qwn 6xp6ri.enoe..
th~e!ore.

Ti'u.th,.,

is a subjeotiv. certitude ot someth1.ng based on a

olear and distinct idea"

The second question we wiah. to
not found:'

aD.$W&:t"

is: Where is error

n.sc.artes taltes tor gl.:'ante.d that tals1tyin things

.f

2!S.

y,.

A.. :.1:., VII) 25.

;t:!d. ~;rI. A.T •• VII, 35.
4aa.J..dane and Ross t p. 237.
SRene Descartes, D~efOY£S!
York,. 1(50), p. 12.

.s l\;11tth~.

trans. LaFleur (New
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is absurd. G What t then, of the possib111 ty of error in the imagination or senses?

llna.ges, talten as psychic events are true. 7

The senses, sinoe they do not 1:aunediately perceive things outside, must be true.

Error will come in only when judgment is

involved, by which we mistakenly suppose that these p,&rceptions
are likenesses or things outs1de. 8
Neither can ideas, in themselves, be talse aocording to
Descartes in

_wl;,;;.,ed_1_t_a_t_~_o Te~tia t

ftNow as far as ideas are eon-

earned, it we oonsider them only in themselves and do not relate
them to something else, the,- oannot, properly speaking, be

talse. tt9
id~a

Oue reason tor this impossibility of error is that an

is just what 1 t is and nothing more.

true for still another reason.

But ideas must be

An idea is true in the sense

that what it represents muat have real being.

Wftt'e this not the

ease, God would deceive us by oreating id$l!ls that represented
1.llll"e:a.l things.
When we say

But here we must :make an important dist;inetion.

that an i.deel in 1'be.lf' is true t we are speaking ot

cleU and distinct ideas.

Descartes bases the veracity of a

oleu and distinot 1d.,a, on the principle that God exists t and

that .'Ie:t7thing we ha.ve comes from Him, ever;ything, that is I)
6 Kee.ler , p.

147.

"Ibid •
•

1

8:r~1d.•
9Me~~tat1ons, LaFleur. p. 33.
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that has positive real1t7,

But aoonf'tl8ed andobscu:re idea is

not positive.inca it put1cipates in notr...ingness, that is. it i
not wholly per.tect. lO And $0, as
shall see, these ideas (eo

w.

tUtted )dO

not contain formal eln"Or, although they do contain

ma1ierial erx.-or.
As long

8.$

an idea. is just an idea. EtXisting in the mind.

there can be n.o error-.

fJ:he reason Descartes gives for this

statement 1s that "tf r oonsidered the ideas only as certr.dn
m.odes (Ol:*l!lspects)ll of m:/ thought, without 1ntend1ng them to

rtlter to some oth.J" eD.riol" ob3eet, they could hudJ.y offer me
a <>lUlnce of meld.Ilg a mistake. ,,12

. t.fh1s last quo_tion gives us a clue to a further diatinatio

De.cutes

ma.kt:as about' eftc-%'1 namely, between an 1dM being ma-

t_la11,. or .formally false.

nal

lOf!

a.

spoke above of giving the _te....

error, and so it is only natural for h1m to. make the

dini.nc1iion between f'ormal and. aterial error.
tin~t

1d.& is not formally :tala.• " sinee formal

A el.ear andtia·~o·r

is had only

in judgment.· Nor is suoh an 1d. . even material.ly .talse, 8.1noe

a. eleu anddl..st1.ne'b: idea is of 1 ta very na:ture true t sinee it
comes trom. God, and is the or1tel."ion of t:t'U.th.
f

if

t

But Goni"uaed

)

l0!!ll_ ~t A.T., VII, ~39.

~e 'WOrds

(ct. !mil> !U"

ta,ons" are not .found in the original Latin.
A,T.tIX:. 29.)
nOll

12H!SiA;if!;iiioy, J..aFleu.t>, p.. 33.
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ideas can have material talsity t l} although they canno1; have
formal falsi fly $1;Qce formal error is had only in the judgmen:b.
Such ideas are oalled materially false beo.s,use th$Y can offal." to
the wi~l the ma'terial for an erroneous asliJent~

,So we conclude

that, the only ;falsity ideas can have is tlle material .+al.sity of

conluaed ideas.

But si:l.lJl.e material i'alai ty is not real. ex'l'or,

we ce.n say that ideas int:tlomselves are not talse.
Perhaps a. .t'l.lrther clarificatio.n of wilat DesOra..rtes me-ans by
a.o.nfu.aed ideM would be praf'i.table bere.

Byeonfusedideas h.e

us'Q;ally means ideas of tio-called secondary quali. ties.

@:ple,color,. heat, Qold, or pa.in.

For ex...

1'he oordusion in such idea.s

oomeafrom the l:aot t.hat we canaei va them as existing outside
the nlin:1 in bodies. when the tacto! tb$ matter is
repre$ent nothing existing; outs1de the min4,14

t:r~t they

~ese ideas in

themselves are so obsoure that they do not reveal their subject1,vity,and, theretQre . . . tend to mistake them :for

a.entati ves ot existing things.15
sent what is nothiIlg as

1;f

~epre

But 111 ~11 W t they repl'e-

1.t were something.16 And thu.s ma-

terial fals1t;t is had when ideas "represent that whioh.1s nothing u

th.ough it ware something, n 17

r.

PI

13Med ,*

J

m"

14a~g ...

A.T Il· VII. 43-44.

A ..,T. t" VIII.

'5-;'6.

15Keeler, p. 158.

l~" lU,., A.. :r., VII,
17,

4,,,

•

Fu:cthermore, in these confused i4eas we reo _ognize nothing
so 'great or so $ltCellent that it seems im.pihssible that they eould

arise from

~self.

Since 'they repre.sent anti ties tr.t.at do not

exist. we know that 'tihey proceed

t%"()m

nothingness; that is, they-

ooeurin us only becau.se som.th1ng is laoking in our nature,

whioh natu.re is entirel,- per.feot.
be trae, nevert11elese; sinoe
we

08.l'll'lbt

even

olear~

~he;r

And

even if then ideas should

show me so littltl) reality t.hat

dist1ngu1s.h the ob;jeot represented fro·m

the non-existent. we see no reason fOr denying that these ideas

come from o'tU"Selves.

And since they are 80 derived. they do not

come from God, as do eaar end distinct ideas; and

$0

again God

istfted from any blame o~ causing us to commit er:uors. 18
~s

tar we have seen that the imagination. t'hesenses t

i&8.S ee not in themselves falsEh

st-'1llg?

and

\Vhat, th.$n; of the under-

As we saw in our anaqs1a of the understanding in

chapter 3, this f'aGulty is receptive and passive.

It aa.n nei-

thel' modify nor distort the ideas wh.i.ch it r&oeiv.6. beeause

such motilica1"ion andd:ieton1on would involve action, and h&nee
wouldexce$d. the ea.pacity of a passive faculty.

The under-

ste.n41ng merel,- eonoei'led ideas, while the will -att11."l'lS and denies the..lll.

For this reason no error 1s found in th. understand-

ingoonsidered in itsel.t.

But the understanding is al'so unable

to mak. mistakes because tide raoul ty, though limi. ted t is ,from
..

i,
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God, and, therefore,

D~scart0$

its nature erroneous. l9

concludes tr..at it must not be of

Were trlis not so t~':od would be guilty

ot deceit.
Now since the will in i teelf cannot be false, because it
too is a faculty that comes from God t and

ir~eed

is a pertect

tao..u.lty,20 tl'lere seems to be only one possible solution to the
vexing problem ot error.

It is in no

0.n6

of'our .faculties, nor

in ideas in themselves. it must be oontained in some combination

of these element..

And so it is.

Error lies in the judgment,

whioh consi.sts of the affirmation or denial on the p8.I't ot the
will·o:f what is presented to it by the understanding.

Ez'ror is

:formally in the judgment"

Now that wa have answered these prelindnary

questior~

of

the nature of truth and ot where fal.sity is not found, le't us
proceed to give Descartes· complete analysis of the will in ex-

ror.
Error,ind.eed. was quite a problem for

Descartes~

He cer-

ta;l..nly could not den,y the exist6nce of many errors in the world

of &peeulative and practical thought.

As at matter of fact, the

presence of these m.any BrI'Ors a:nd conta.'adictions in philosopr.;r
i.sprec:i.sely what incited him to begin the Whole philosophical

investigation anew, aXJd to devise a new m.at:lod whiah would admit

19.~.

a.

A.TtI t VII,

2OI,bid .. pp. 56-58.

,8.
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aa;ic1; ot no el'ror, but wbich, if followed exactly, would result
L71

8,

flawless philoaophy.

But it was still necessary for him to

aocount for the o'bvious presenoe or error in tl1.6 '\vorld n.nd to
give an explan.atiol1 tor it.

privation . . . . of some knowledge which it seenlS to me
t;hat I should possess.41 21 And we als.o saw that Desoartes places

l:'O:r::

as

As we saw, Descartes described sr-

ua

error neither in the will nor in the understanding considered in
themselves; so it Vias obvious for him to conclude that error
comes from a combination of these two faculties in jUdgment. 22
This act" which uses both the general modes of thought, is an
a.ftirmation. or den1a1 of' what i.s pa:-esented to the will by the

understanding.
Judgment, as we haVe seen, i8 caused by the will alone,
sil;lce, tor one thing, a judgment consists o£ an af'firmation or
denial, which operations are lBrtormed by the will alone.
part played by the undentanding is that of a conditio
n2!},.23

The

~.

gus.

Descartes· dootrine, how.ver, is not as complete as we

would 11ke it to 'be t tor he leaves oertain basic questions un-

answered.

For instanGe, \vhat is the relation ot the will to the

u.tlderstanding?

~?:

How is the will moved by the understanding.,

r_;>Descartes does not use this term when ref'erI'ing to the
IJa'rt played by the understanding in a ,judgment ,but it seems to
rtJe a valid interpretation of his doctrine.
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since the understanding must present 1 t with an idea, and :yet 1.&
a passive racul ty?

From the

~rip.e1R:\a

we learn that th.. nIl can

judge only when an idee. 1s presented to it by the understand1n.g~4
but beyond this general expla.nation. Descartes does not expressly
show how the

t~vo

f'aculties

~.

related..

For this na.son, we m.ust

agree with Protessor Koj7.'e when he states: nIn spite ot the important plao.e the theQry of judgment ooo.upies in the Oartesian

system, it is an;rthing but clear.

The~

development fragmentary;

1'401;

whi~e

the

terminolog is vague, the

that the position ot the

problem is determined by' error and. not by knowledge i t$eU t renders the 1nterpre'be:b'1.on extraordinarily hard .. n25

:aut

in o:rd.er to underst.8f1-d the dootri.:£le. that Deaeutes 40es

pres.•at. we must analyze bis ootPlanat1on of judgment. &pacifical....

17, en erroneous judgntent. basing ou.r analysis on
of the will undertakin in the pl'.'eVious ehapt.er.

that the will has tYro general che.ractar.1st1os.

ert7 0.:£ being unlimited and

tH$.

the explanation

fh6N we sa.w
namel~ t

:Lta prop-

liere. eaoh o£ these two char-

a.cteristics o.rul help us expla1n an erroneous judg,men:t.
F11:'et ot al.l. how does the will as unl1m1 ted help ue to explain error?

G04 has gi:veIl man ma.ny olear and di.stt1not idea.s,

for eam;ple t a clear and, tistinot id.a of God t s own being as
neoess.ar1ly exist1r..;. or
i(,

Ill.

clear and di$t1not ideaot o.ne' s own

l

24~ •.t A.T .. t VIII. 18.
a·'Keel.,J:.I, P. 149. quoting from. 1l!SC5tes ~ die ~Qnola$t1k

(Bonn, 192~n t p. 4·8 •.
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These clear and distinct ideas, of their very ns:ture.

existence.

cannot lead man into error.

And yet even the ideas wb.j,.eh a man

does not have in a clear and distinct manner need not :lead. him
into error.

For a mature and oareful t.hinker· oan always desist

frc>m usent1llg to those oontused and obscure ideas.

But the

point .e w1all to make here is tbat anI,. when man eJUlenta to"
that is" affirms or denies. an idea that 1$ not sutt1e1en.tly

cl$@ and d.i$tinct,

08,n

he er~". 26

And this event iselearly

manta fault and in no wa:y th.e l"eaponsibility of God.
w~e

I! the Wil,

111111 t$d in its assent" sa::!. to the scope of clear and dis....

t1not ideas. the will would never mal'.:e a talse

judgm,~t.

BUt
e~

the real.Jil of the will is unJ.im1ted in so far as its dom.a.1n
tendS: beyond the perfect use of the understanding.

For, as Des-

teUs us, errors arise ffonly :tram the tact that the wil.l is

(~ch)27 _1."e amp.le

and tar-reaching than theunderst.anding, so

that I de not restrain .it within the same liIdts but extend it

ev.nto thOse thing$ which I·· do not understand. ,,28
For example, I see a hOl.'se.and my idea t&11s m.e that 1t is
The will enters in and asSSllts to the judgment that it

a hen!h

1$ oleuly' ahorM. " ~

wtU

it.elf' m:a.ke.$ the att1r.mat1on.
i it·

'~I

I

$qAl :fhat

is a horae.

fhe will

In this case I have truth.

But

,

~9 •• A.T. t •.."I11. 17-18.
21~ WO:t(l"b*auoouV- is not feund in the latin o.riginal.
46.)

!.d.. .1t,. A. T., IX,
as

63
suppOB.ing that I see ..What ~ooks like a horse.

Since that ma;y or
1;;ha.t it is orUl:t~

~

not be a horae. I will make nO' jtldgmen'b

~th

is not euotl,- had in this 08,$., but 11;

is at least aategu,arded..
cO:~.ct

pite •

ol.....q a horse.

The wl..U sta;rat

But 1t the will sa;rs in effect: Des-

and. ODsoure idea o:l that thing I say that i t is
Here we have error.

It, 1n this latter case,

tbe 'h1ng of whieh I have a.n idea really is a horN, tru.th 1s

.ba<1 (W.ly .accidentally.

But the faot to be not,.., ietllat the

el201'(\(;t.. not come from l1t7 Qontused ul'lderf,ltand1ng t but tlNlm
rQh

an~

tQl11 mj

1';_ will.,

1lf3'

But h8H agun we 11lld a laouna in DesOB-l'tes' thqUght.
S~.tlle

will is more exUl'lded than the under.tending, bow can

it_v: in that

~.

in whioh it is tml1m1ted?

For this would

• . . - ito impl7 that the will could aot without tb&. understanding.

NO' speo1f1c solution is given to this qu.ation, though DesQ~ea

.8._6 to· imply' i;hat tM wiJ.l is eoe:x:teMi ve w:i:ub. the

un4ertill1;,a;wU ng 'Whc it P"s:ents .$1 th$l:' a clear ot" an ob·e.cu.re

1<1__

F~tiher

Keeler also ti.r1da Descartes' doctrine incomplete

when he statesc
Iu ht.e
o~.s

end_vo~ t;o be plain and tU'lscholaat1c t. Deso~ten speaks as though he were sat1.-

too

tied with the old fontula. so general in most postAI'1$totel1an Greek schools t the mind has id&8.$ t
t$88.~; the will assents to them a.s real, or rejeots
them; it t~y are not quite olear, 1t ought a1.wa;ys
be oe.ll~ed. talse. He saw well enough. vlh$n he wanted
to, 'that ·'tiMe aocount is altogether inadequate; yet
he .~a4t_tly deol1ned to underbQb a more searching
anal,.i. ot the situation; and especially of the part
that ._.t.. be ...,S1grlK 'to the intellect in the act; ot
judgment. '*29 .
..
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We might look a.tthis unlimited will in another way.
the under$tandi.ng and will are perfeet in their own

Wa;1;

Both
$0

enol'

ean come trom neither left to themselv.ruJ, but only from the judgmellt wherein th\ty jointly aot.

The combination of a Umi ted ,rEt-

strio1;edunderstanding w1 th an unllmi ted free will can explain

error.;O But as long as n are content to contemplate our
thou.ghts. without affirming or denying, we shall never err."l
Bui; Mi$bier would ..... in this case. possess lmowledge, toX' this

eont.plationor pB.$$1ve understanding Itis simpl,. historical
Truth and falsity oan relate only to px'Opoettlona

onnnce.
Q.~

what exists Or oc.eurst not to occurene:es.

_get we

~

:Bat the more

are to rea. knowledge. and the less exptIri..enced or

habituated

po"

00-

are in withholding assent trom propositions pro-

~

to our minds. the more readily do we give assent where we

llO1;

hlly cJ.eu abont what it 1s we are ass4trting,··;2

The Ut1derst$l1c'U.ng ean p&rc.eive the oontent only

8.$

:1 t 1s

pr$sented, while the will can affirm 1 t to be wha.t it i8 not, or
de.ny' that

it

is what it is.

capaoi.ty toatf1rm. or deny..

And so 'the Will is unlimited in its

In tl:d.. uneondi tional freedom lies

the poss1b11.ity of error •
.

I

29Ke.-.J.er, p. 1.49.

'~d. ~M, A.T~. vn, 58.
~l

!!£H19.t

A.!*. VIII. 17.

32bellng f P. 158.

6;
And this leads us to the second el:lsl:a.eteris.tic

its traedollh

ot the Ydll.

Descartes hQ.lds that the will is sOD1et"imes indif-

ferent. but that freedom does not oons~st in this indJ.tf'e:rence .. 33

The mo.re the will is inolilled to a tb.ins the fraer it
~sthat

i$t

whioh

in the scholastt.1c 'terminol.ogy, the less indifference

the: will had the

:&10I'$

freedom. 1 t has.

And since the will has

:mo~ inclination

to a clear and distinot idea. it is .tree~ whan

am distinct idea is ;presented to 1 t

a ~.@

for a judgment. 34-

On,' the other h.a.nd.. when the w111 is per.t$4tly indit'ftrent to
sid.e" as happens when the idea. is oontused an4 obscure

ei'~,r

wh.:n it is. not

~e

that the idea ia olear and ·d1$titet. then

th4/l"J.r11l bas, the lowest grade oJ:
\'.;',;"

f~edo.m~35

The

"Wld$~·band:i.ng

,

iS~$t perteo.t when 1 te i4ea ;L$ elear a.Dd distill.not.·

most,

Oll

'me

l;rhe will ia

Vlhen it assents to that olear and Ust1nctidea, and .1%l

th;i.a1dEJaJ. .1udgment is. had per.f'eot truth.

we have from GOO. {;he les,aable we

ar.

Thus. the more freedom

to err.

kt :here again we £ind oure.elVN uk1ng i:mpoJ:1;u.t questions
of ,Dtacartee

whioh he l.ett tulAtlSwer$d.

Aeoordin8

th, will. has its lowest gra4e ot freedom when it
&~

and oontused :ideas..

to ·,.P$sea.rtes

a$.e~t$

The cause of this lack

or

to oJ)-

p ....feo.t

frte<10ln is 1 ts :.tnd1fterenoe, .which seems to be the s . . as being
, • .f~

'n

4 .1

unlimi ted.
the

wi~l

But when we ask DeseaJrt $S for a d1.s'b1nction between

as tree and as unl1.mi ted we ask in. vain.

Our freedom 1.8

und$niab~1'

$.Ss.nt to only what is

c~ear

used. as it should be usaG: when we

and disti.!lct, and when we refrain

from as.enting to what 1s only obacure. 36

We are never compel lee

tou.S$ OUl.1' .free will, and cant therefore, suspend judgmeX1t whenev~~

we want..

And this treedom, wlrl.ah seems to be freedoIll of

6X'$1?O.ls. t though Descartes does not use the te.na.. is

b;r ,.rielding or withholding aasent.

Gxe~e1sed

Perhaps if Desea.rtres had :ma44

aUstinotion between fre·edom of exercise and specification, his
4<>otr1n& 'WOuld be clearer.
CV~U!, . in

silencEt

o~titon

~$dQnl

Aa a matter of faet, he seems to pa&1

of speo1tiee:tion, since he defines the

'Of the will as trtMdol'll of exereise:

n~1or

it oonsists

onl.y· in tl:te 1"act tllAt we can • '" • do a givan thing or not do it
......that is· to say. we oan. a.tl·ir!'J.or dany, pursue or avoid. "'57
~.

complete OUl:' analysis of the will in error,... might dis-

cua;a:brielly the two general sauro••
ItM:l1llgllP

or

error ·aecording to .

In both of these causes we find the erroneous judgment

e.a.sed by the unl.imited .and. .free nll.

iJ~hese

two

caU$$S

are,

fir.to:! all, a precipitate judgmen.t, due to i:nsuf.fi.cient caret
8.n4 secondlYt a prejudiced judgment. due to the toun.d.ation we
MY. of bAbit or strong t ••llng.}8
ft

"1

,;

'Ii' ""

'~*~1d... pp.59-60.
'?IIla,et~()n.~~ LaFleurt p. 51.
'~AA,}i"""'" D ... 63 ..
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Sometimes

l'lS

are ttnwillin0 to t1ak& the trouble to th1nltouJr

and state clearly what the character of the .fact under oontemplation is t and so we acquiesce too readily in paasin,g ,judgment

upon\vhat 1s on1,. more or lees clear..

In this case our ,judg-

ntent e.x:presses oonjecture a:nd not knowledge.

~r.hiliJ

basty con-

jeo.ture is e.rron.eous precisely because it misinterprets a real
character 0·1' what is g;iven in thought, the misinterpretation

coming' from a vague awa.reneas of what is given .for interpretation.

Knowledge, on the other hand, is due, 'in put at leas'b.

to a clear discernment of what is given .for knowledge.

TIle

trouble lies in the fRet that we can affim or deny w"l thout rostri'Otion, as of'1:;en as we ehoose; even Itthen WEll do not cl.ear:ly

underatandw!:lat we are atfirming or denying t whleh is not infrttqu,ent.

The obvious solution to this state 01: at.fa.:lrs is to

re:tw:Je: to judge on
lJ.1J:t~

jud.gment.

anything we do not clearly und$rstend",.39

$0coOO gl:lneral c.ause for error lies. in apH;jUdic..d

nue to vanity, we

may

hesita.te to suppose we lack

knOlVledge of those

e()!1.~lOn

oW•. to possess.

Or we lray be re-luetant to aoeept a proposl-

matters wideh the maj ori tyof men

tionthat is aotually true, beoause it aont11cts with some be11*£ we bold as certain. which we do not wish to admit as false.
Then again, a proposition is not true merely because 1t is at.....

.fU.'med to be so by the generality of mtllDkind, beeatlae tr.ds m&'p.' .,
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jorlty is no lesa

pr~1pitate

than w.

in its ju.dgments

This

general agreement is not su!ticie.nt to make a proposition true;

therefore ., Dlustchec:t our strong inclination to believe
it1llltil we ourselves have verified 1t/l-O What we Blust do 1s to

.and.

W$,

n take

aX'n1S against these i.nsidious forms o.f rashness and bias

in. ju.dgment. ney,er afti:rmiIl{j w!:m.t we do not know to be certainly

true, or wl1.at is even capable of being doubte<1 .. t. 41
~Q

sum

UPt

than, Deacarti6s' 6JC,Position of $XTOr, we tind

that error is not a. real thing but a privation.
nei ther comes from God, nor does God concur

j.n

fouurl in the iriie.gination, nor 1n the sellses.
c;leeJi'an.d distinct ideas either
6r;£'Ot'

fQ

.fomal~y

it..

~I'

is not

It is not found in

or Jaater1ally, although

can be round in contused ideas in the sense that they ot-

to the nIl the ingr(!l.a.ienta, as it

ment"t . A:.P..d.
031~iOe

ihere.t'ore, it

$0

wax-iii,. ot a

.tala. judg-

confue$d ideas axe Sfdd to be ma"bu1:ally .false.

l\l.ei thor the will nor the

s:ru,,:t>~.et 1;0 ~Z~t

Ullde~at:andi,ng. in th.u~.lv •• t

this privat.ion in us. can only be ;f'ound.1n an

aot wh:i.oh coIabines tIl.es. two .taeulti$cllh

This act is

ju~entt

by which the wi11 a.£tiJ."lI1s or denies what is presented to it
tb.tt und.eZ's tanding.

-ui-,••
mal

'uthough God has given

U$

flIrrO'I"S, s;i.ne&

from a misl4se of O't.lr taouJ.t;y of rill1n.g.

aJld p.t."oxima'b$ eause 'Of

.~

thbse t#O .facul-

we can in no wa7 blwne Him. .tor causing our

er~~stems

are

~s

for-

Vl.'Or, the misus·e of our unlimited.
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frttedOm.. a.r1aea trom. the vuious remote aotl..rces .. name],yt that we

aoquire prejudices in chl.ldhood, and are hardly able to forget

shout them in

lat~~

111'e; 'Ghat we become fatigued easily when

cOllcantrating, especially on tJlose ob.jects which are not sensi-

ble; and that we attaoh our thoughts to wows whic.h do net express 't.MXll \vi th accuracy ..
And :firJally t

wnat

is the role ot the will in elwor?

above that error exi eta formally only in

We so

And fl:om the

jud~t..

natve '01' the will and' Ullderst&1l.d1ng we can easily see wby the
will alone makes the judgment.

The uruit:u."'Standing iSl.'estrict$4

re:b:hu Ua.:.tTowl;r. since the l'a.:ng.e ot propositions it can contemplate is quite lim1 ted.

Although it can contemplate

~Llan;y things

obscurely and eontus$dl;y t the number of those things it call
~$tand

e.learly and d.iutinotly is s.ma.ll"

.vu,. 13 given no assig!l$.ole
Vlbtt~

the will, hQw-

It can a.f1'l.1:m

lim1t~

the propositious be oleaX' or oosoW?e.

in th1$ unl:l m:i t:$O. w111 that w ue

To

.0

OZ'

(;leny

It is p:t"'ti'cisely

susoeptible 'to ewor.

When the 1.de:u, even obscure ones, are

lller"elyGOlltenlp~at$d

the 'UMersta:Q.d.ing", we have noe,rror.

by

But villfUl 'the will becom.es

rash and usents to t!leaeideel.$, it 18 misusing its !l?e$doIll,
~by to~g

a mistakenjudgm.llt.

'ffnile it is a misuse ot

.t'r••do~ that condemns us to in.numerable N:'ro;t's, 1t is a proper
'US:e of this i;l.'ee4.Olllthat saVfta us fx'Om.

$3:'ro.'..

Fox we are using

.f'aedoXll, correet17 when we &1 tMr assent to clear and distinct

1deu:.,o:r Whe!l we .retuse t o o b a o u r e ones.

Thus, the

deliver us from it.

OlUTI01 SY

NOW tXl-at we ha:V'$ oonsidered just what Descartes held on er1."'O;r:,

a.:nd. how he solved tho problem by the use

are ready to give a.n (Waluation.

or

the Will, we

This evaluation will oonsist

ina double critic1s.m, a.s we point-ed out in the introduct1Qn.,
We shall tr,y, first ot all. to 'point out
fic~ties

two in.ternal

t:t~e

dir-

in Desoartes· use of' the will in error, and then the

en!ernal ditticu.ltif);s.

This secoll.u o1'i ticisItl

son' of Desoartes t position with that

oi.~

fit.

be a oompari-

·~ll

ThoL'la.s.

But b&tore we prooeed. to the two internal inconsistencies
we tind in .Desoartes· position, it "V'culd be well to refer to the

om1ssions we found in the previous chapter.

Th!.n"e we discovered

that Descartes left unanswered .'number of 'basic qU$s:tii.OD.S,
whieh"U answered by him t would have made his doctrine more intelligible. or would have shown him, that his doctrine needed reConeeJ.~

y,ia1on.

at.$nQ,:i;ng we saw

'bhe relation ot the wi.ll w1 th the unde.r-

that two1mportant quest1oll$ were Zeft unsolved.

First ot all. bQw is the will moved by the understanding?

See-

omUy,. how can tb.e wi.ll opel:'ate ;in that area in wb.ic.h.1t is more

extena.1.ve
will _

t,ha;n

the undsrstanding?

COnoerning the

found two other problems left \l.l'lSettled.

?O

n.atu~e
Fi.l~at

of the
of all,
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what is the distinction between the will as unlimited and the

will as tree?
in the will?

s$Oondly, is their any liberty of specification
These omissions seem to make Descar1ies' dootrine

at the will, and speelfieally of theall

in error, le.s intel-

ligible, it not incorrEtet.

Now let u.s cliseuss the two internal illCoJllSistencies present
in D&soartes' expl8.tlation of the will in error.

The two ineon-

siE)'bencie. or contra41ct1ons we find are: (1) that he mcplioitly
explained error as a. judgment otthe will.

But in truth, he

seems to be t.irtven to make jwlgment an ao1'i of the undestand;1.nea

and (2) that the basic purpose in his explanation

to

:ere.

God .from

an:r blame

1neausing our errors.

ot error was
But in th.

fin41 . .lye1•• he oannot help but plaee the blame on God, to
80m.

~ntt

no matter bOw mueh t1118 is against his pious Cath-

0110 1iemperulen.t.
yu-.t of all, then,

we shall p'oint out that error is due to

Qr

the will t no mat

how much Descartes would have it otherwise.

we mean that 1t

an impI;'opell use ot the und&rstand1ng an4 not
'f.;'• •

is dU(i to the 'UtJ.d.erstand.ing .ven in rd. system.,

"It _s Des-

ca»t.... int&nt1on originall,. to show that error 1s directly due

tou lmproper use ot our unlimited tre.a.om in will1ng, but the
conclusion to whiGh he is in pQ1nt of tact eventually driven 1s,
that 1;he UN is ·improper· preaisely because of a def'ect-not in

our vdll. but in our undarstand1ng.
to)!ihai; .iSODS01.tee

For, though to yield assent

or contused is to abuse our freedom of .S,.tl,
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B!!1eutauMBs. ,,1 No one will deny that the understa;nd.ing alone
is l:'espolls1ble for apprehending axqtJ:dng obsourely..

"Ths.t whioh

a contu.sed idea is 'of', * is never intrinsioallY' sueh that. 1.t it
18 peree1ved at all. it must be eon.fukledly or obscurely per-

oeived..

It 1.8 alway. intrins1oally. suoh that, unless the faoulty

oonoe.nQea. in its apprehension is defective, :1:t must be olearly
~e

distinctly perceived.

and.

confusion or Qbacurity :hn the

idea is not, therefore. due to the thing of

_t

w~oh

""he idea i!

an 1d.&* ,,2:

it there weN no oocasion in which we ought to withhold

the assent in order to aVQid error. that is t, it we bad no eoru-

fusta.

~r

o'bacure ideas., then 'VlOU,ld be no possibility

or

error •

.And tlO Keeling oonolude. _ "Bo. 'to Descartes t s d101rum t.b4:t in

Willing alone _

are responsible for enar, we mu.st

~.

the re-

seJ:'Va:t;:1on tbat our detective (oon.tusri) a.pprehension 18 oertainl,

an aeeelulory before the fact J "3
S1n¢$

the understanrHng ;1.s passive. aocording to Desoartes,

anJUogous to a pi-ace of wax
re.tleeting 1.mages , i t is

~() • .1ving

inoapabl$o~

impressions or a. nd..rror
.tomning as.y'nthes.1s of

10.'.8" let alon. pronouncing them tne or :tuse..
exercised by the nll.

~.t"ONf
• F

,.

,.

t

$' "

Tb.1s act iS t

HOQver, aa Keeler objeots,

"it 1s one thing to marko1f in general 'terms th1.$

"

~_•.

op-

position b&tween pass1'Ve and active faculties, and quite anotn.r

to take it .in all ser1ollsnass.
st'ood it
In

to.

s~ctly,
sp1~

of

Descartes hi.msel.t never under-

nor aee:epted. 'the psychology it would

~6rtain

r1ed to by th. strong

Yd. •• tnt;elleotJual1st

baV$

led

out-ot-th.-'Uia7 positions he was oarof Tolun:ta.l'1sm in hi.s other-

\Uldel!'~ent

ph1,losop~t

th.e fur.t.da.memtal d1..tt....ne$

beW.- inveUeet an4 w111 remal.ned for him wh9.t it .htIld b-een tor
iFh$:SchQolmen, the torm... ie 1th& ftilOUlty or the un.,
~t of th6 go04.·4 D$scutes takes tor gran:ted

tel

tn.

1&t-

~.'t the

ju4gment is the proper seat of t.ruth. and that the "e:t:'J" purpose
Of ph11oaopitLeal studj" 1$81';0
c1at1ono~

_~o,..

sound end coxwrect

i1h l . '

mind to'ff8J!d tll.

j~lltson

ellun~

all mattersth.toome

FOl:'this •••on Keeler oonelude. ttbA" tlj:ud.gmen:t 1e

¥m .p~l17 uact .:f' t:U unaeratantiing'. however lI'luch he

t01it

mtq'.~_

to

1'$f~tQt:he

·The· naSon tOft th1.
.i.ng

41~tthe

have

se'.

f;6 de

OamlDt

.~••

all., "0

ua.rti.on is cl.ar.

w:ttb. ath1n8 being

'be :l'e4uoed to

til

mere

aota restllNl. 8f,)od and &v11.

Sf)

Gl1

Aft1:r.ming and deny.

not so. andths.$ two

~u1:nS

or shunning because

It is evident to ullthat we

of1Jen aff1l!".l1t when .. rtal17 f ••l nothing but aver.ion, .and that
4

belel", p. 164.

~e:ne

a.n4 Roa., P. 1 ..

6'a~.
/:""'....1·8r,
. Pi .,,L.C"t'.,
I:!h

7'+
nega.tion can be oa11ed shunn1ng"only 0,. a transparent me1;aphQx-.-.7

Descartes tells Gas5t.lndi that "quia ita vis, ita 3Udi-

ifhis is true enough. but prov•• only that judging and

08S ••• 8

believing

they

~

41"8

$U.bjeot to the

1~luence

o£ the will, ·tiUld not that

essentially acts of that faculty.

,.
Aceoltding to Ketle;!;", Gilson was not exaggerating when he
~te

oan,

that t 'tin s.pite of the seemingly contrad1otory texts that

,b~o;l.1iedt

ti.QIl .o.t

it r$mai.na true to say that the Oartes1an ooncep-

the ;r$l.at1on between intellect and Will

tbat o! 8t.. 'J;lhomas h.;1.msltlf. It 9

i8

a'boottom

In other words, the undepstand1ng

not the will, iJu.dsea.
The a.conl. 1nvemalinconaistency. tind in his doctrine
is

»••oarte.

t~t

does not prove what he starte4 out to prove.

One, ofbia ma1n objeot1 V$S in his lengthy
wa.$•.·.to P~c.

Ttd.s.~·

oienor

all blame for error on ourselVes, none on God.

baa not done.

ia so good..

&xp~a.nelt1on

40

Descartes would SUPPO$.tha.t sine. God

honest t He could be !lei ther a dece! Vel.' nor wish

to . . CAU•• our eXlTOr$ in

~~.

~~s

But thi.s al.:t....good God m.akes it ",en more

o£ our

di~.f'1cult

.n»N~

lJ!heratoh. we are the adequate

'10 t:D';pla.in our en:ors, no.. easier..

al~.powp.fu.l

Why is i'lt that

an

G04, who endOWed us with per.tee1i .. ld.llsshould not

7~&A.

~siI, A. . ~." X, 559.

84tl.,. l64.

:X.

1!t_loQ~

quoting G.ilson,
(Paris, 191;), p. 265.

l4\lr. iber t {

.9!!U. DesSlI:£ t81

.u

15
be held responsible tor permitting obscure and contus$d ideas in
ou..r 1.lll'de~st:an<l1ng t when He 4ou~d have easily created us vd:tb. an

un4~and1ng unifo~mly olear
Das~G1iJ f

in its

oparation?lO

as we saw. tried to answer this dif.tioul t;r t and

414 . . . .1" it to his own aat1.sfactioll.., by sa.y1.n8 t'll&tthe under-

s't..,.1t1g lao! its nature tin1te, that 1s, there are lllaIl.1' t.h1ngs
~ it cannot eomprehena. 11 Keel1ngrep11ea to 'this by saying

"But. 11iaat be

ob~eflte4.

whetker or no God 18 responsible for

llAv1.ng endQ_d, finite selves w,i1ih understanding

peot to theeUtll,;tf

llm1t~

in l"ea-

ot 1ihei.J:" knowledge, Heo,artainly does aeem to

ber:espons1ble (notwith.aiianding D•• cartes t s denial) tor endowing

us with un4entandings,.wb.1eh, STen ¥f1:!iB!n the ;t'e,stricted ranges
otthe:1r {)Qlllpetence, shoUld all too often prove :1.neompetent 1
Even "though we could not have cogn1:tions of

ev~ng

tb.. . .t1,oally knowable t wl:Qr $bould

or 8.1.J.Y, o·t, the COS-

nitlons our o<>nst1tutioD.$ do

permit

80 m.any t

thJtt 1s

us to Mve. 'be uncl.ear ·atld

QOnt\l.fI41 n12

w. saw., theae eo::n.f'l.Uted and obecure 1dea.$ come ..trom see-

As
on~

qual! ties.. W'hi.eh are CQn.tu.sad precisely beeaus* of Des-

ca,r1;as' d1eiloto.n17 between body- e;nd soul.

It hi. thec.1.7 of ar-

rorWflre not subdeeted t<> tiM.£! buic pJ:incipl.t it does not see
IJ

I.!";

i'"

:.

t

J

l°Ke.ling, p.. 270.
..11
· !d..!!, A.. If1;, VII" 60.

~K$.UnB. p. 210, footnote.
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that he would have tal len i.nto error on. this poi:ttt.

He did not

want tc blame those obscure ideas on God, and. so he said that
the.,. cue from himself,.

E1thel.. . !U.s nature was defeotivet or there was

reason.!,.

0,1" tWQ

But they could come tram him. tor either

aome.bing lacking in the

natu~.

of things.

Wllicheve.;t' 110m of

the dl1emma Descartes takes, he must. it seems.. place the: b.lame
'lo~

tba.t deficiency on God in some way or other.
He

waf;;

so obsessed with the idea. that God had no part in

this business oJ: erl"or tmat he denied that the Oreato.;r was eve-n

giving His coneur;r®oe to, er1'Or.

If Descartes had seen the dis-

tine1;.ion between the ent1 ty ol an. act and

j. ts

tale:i ty t he wou.ld

have lUore' easily solved his problem, and still saved the iUlnc,1;:ity

'otGod.
New we

o~.s

eom..

to the ,final aspect ot our or! tie1sm of Detl.... "

doctrine of the will in error.

l'te shall try to show that

his pol81t1011 is unsa:tisfactory fol." a nutnber of reasona which
" " c:1t.e4 ill the introduetol.7 chapter.
1)

~

.ei.rltt pOi,i~t wtfpha.ll tak. up for C1"i tic1sm

u.el.'tion th-.t the understanding iamerel;.y passive"

u

the

W. have

stZlt.$$ed this basic Goncept in Desca.:rrbes' doctrine, aQ we need
no1;explain his position here.

IJ$t it su..ffice. by ws:y of crit-

ic1_ to show that the understanding is n.ot me.t:'ely pas.sive t bu.t

act1p as well.
1;1; ieelear that

cause . .

8t;~

our ll"ltelleot is in some way passive be-

Q.rt.with nothing, that is, we at one time do not

??
know something, and at another do.

Our knowledge does not

chang., the thing known, but in some wa:y it ohanges us.

Since tM

intellttct (pos.s1b.le) is passive, in pot~ney. it must be actuated.

The possible intelleot cannot be aotuated or informed by itself,
at least not in so far as it is in potency. nor can it be ao-

tuated by innate id.eas.

It oannot be inf'ormed by some external

ews$: such as an intuition of God, the senses alone. or by some
a:reated thing such as

9.

'WOrd.

a. teacher, etc.

The only thing

lett: is that it is aotuated by some act. whioh is also an intellectual i'a..(ftll1'sy.

~1s

operation we give to the agent intellect.

Wa need not go into tl1e part pla.yed by the phantasm. or the im-

pressed and.

~S8ed

species.

Suffioe it to say that the in-

tellect cannot be merely passive, since we must have some active

t'ac.ult,.to inform the :possible intellect, to move it from pot.n....
cy t. act.
Wh~S,t.

Thomae

deserilH~s

meftly __alts down the word

the operation ot the intellect he

1n.t!l11i:s~l".

etymologically t and eon....

elua..st"bat 110 understand 1$ a. prooess by which ona Hinterius in

1pqrei ea"Sentia veritatem quodammodo legit.ul~ This process,
o1:>v1ously, cannot be }ullrformed by a faculty that 1$ passive
allOtlfh

We

~a..'1al$o

discovtlr tht natUl'.'e of the intelJ.eet as an

operative faoulty from the natu:r.-s.l appetite of the intellect and
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from i

1:;8

dynamic chuacter..

Ita dy'namia eharaoter is ev.idenoe4

in. the pursuit of lmowi:n.g; the

~:;6e.rch

for solutions .and

1n~

sight$1 the striving to make thin.get aotua.lly intelligible ..

wh1~b.

is the characteristio o£ the agent ihte.lleot.

2)

Next.. let us discuss Deac8.l.. .tes' assertion that truth is

in the Will.
COllCe~

Although his poSition on truth is not the p.l?imaxr.y

or this thesis. still .. an underatand1r.J,g on his mistak.

in ttn.s point will l'l'lake it olearer why he failed to explain ex--

satistaotori.ly.

Nt'

The question of supnme imponanee concern.ilng truth is: In

which .faault,' is it found?

Descartes protests that it is in

the will because tIle understanding if; passive.

Both the con-

tention a.nd the reason to.it" it must be denied.

Truth is f.ou.nd

tbat operation ot the mind .in which that

is known about a

thillg is .referred to the t.h1ng formally.

vthi~h

And, obV1ou.s·qt th1s

opera:u1on can takeplaoe only in the judgment of the intel.lect.
When the intelleot ;judges that a thing known oonfoX'm8 .'1#0 the
£o~

and

_1;
f~_

whi.ch it apprehends about that thing. then it first knows
truth.

~r(f8SeS

This it does by composing or di:riding.

iS t it either applies to or .remOTes from the tll1ng sign!by the

subject

Qj.'

a Pl"Opoe1ti.on.8ome torm s1gn.lt1ed by

'till. ~ica.te.15

;)
"

ii, t!:

.~

Th1s the.i.a b.as been an uplanat10n ot Descartes· doc(

I I"

)

!

tr1.ne of the will in

19
We bave seen that error occurs when

erI"~.

the w.ill affirms or deni.a what 1$ not clearly and d1.a"t1netly

perceived.

But aeaording to St. Thom8.serror 1s found in the

judgaumt of the intellect undu the influence ot the will.
S;Lnoe

.e pointed. out in

th.3~t

8.

pr8'ri.ous point ot or1:ticiaxn (2) that

is not in the will

a8

Descarte. held, and sinoe we

w.Ul point ou.t in aauoseq:u.ent point of er1'1o.1sm (4) tbat ob-

;.I.-tiv. eV1denc.e1s tbe criterion tor truth. it will be rather
euJ' to show the rel.at1onah1p between the will and 1ntelleet in
~orf

We m1.ght point out agun that DesoflX"bes t&11ed to demon-

Bt3te this rellJ.";lonsh1p 1..n. hi. system.

neso,mes. of course. agrees that error 1$ .found in ;:Judgment,because heN alone •• have atf1mat1on or negation. whioh
opel'!a:tion8 can only beplaoed by the will sinoe tha't fa.eul..,. of
'bbe m1n4 is alone act1p.

It

h$. baA

not pos1ted the fut that

t.lle u.n.a..rsta.n41ns is passive, perhaps he would not have fallen

:Ln.o th1$position of making judgment an act of the wrong t8.4u1-

t7.
But

we know that

in an UTOliilU)U8 judgmen'bthe ln1a'tlleot at-

tr1l:m.tes a :toa to somethins wh1chthat thing d08. no" bave. or
donJ,u to somoth1ng a1orm. wi:d.oh it doe. bav..
do_ 'Uhe wil.l pl.a;r?

Btlt wh$t part

In a 'trUe judgmenttlUl intellect is moved

'byob.j:.otive evtdence.

But in an erroneous judgment there is

not sutfioiet evid<tnee because W'Mit 1s talse cannot
intel.l••tob;Jeotively, since it is not objective..

1lO"..

Ue

1!.b.erefo~et

we
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need something elae to lllove the 1ntellect, and this some'tb1ng

else oan only be· the will.

The intellect cannot determine it-

aelf f $ince it is not a free pot4ulCY.

Therefore, it is moved

by the will. which 1s in man the principal moving power.

AoeordJ.J:Jg to

!~itain

fthwnan .rror is caxplained tor Des-

cat1ies J.n the sue wa;y as theologians uplai.n ang.el:Lc error; I
"an, mo_

PJl'8ei"~t

t.bat the Cartesian theoZ7 ot enor, so

little oonsistent with hi. position, would only become coherent

ana.

logical. 11 one brought 1io it. with au1table emen4&t1on. the

cu. 01' the errors ·of f·allen epl.r1 ts.. l?eeipi. c y of jude;...
mel';!:tHtt 16 v~ an e.n(Iel ~t he apprehends an objeot clearly..
\Vb., he 1.Dq)etru.Qus17 6X.'tenda h1s affirmation beyond What he
d.~.t4l'lda

will..

and fP.v$S a

Man af.tirma

Ot'

pJ*•• lp111ate US$nt,

it is because of his

denitts, aecording to. Descartes, beyond

~•.

.be etear1:rand tU.st1no:t17 peNeiv-es, from a

tr..

_llt from

all

U,l1-

in hi

\Ve~$s

impetuosity for whioh bie will is solely Na

potl.albl••

4) .le was unti.oned in the introduct.1on an<l

~_:t'$d.

to

maV'$1mes i.n tiM body ot this thesis, De.cut•• • olt1.tu1on of
..nth 1s ael.u and dist1llct idea.

If we have a olea.r and d1

1d.no1; idea ofaome1Jll1113 t tihat idea 18 neoe.saril,. tru...

It 1.s

t:l;4a $ubjao1t1ve olarity which 1s fQ,:: De.canes that wbien movet3

thew1.11 to a.a_t.

It:
. I"'

1sg~od
(

1

to note t however, that in mak1.ng elea.rnesa of

ofeOU86J, ooulld find nothing like

obj~et1ve

evidence, because

wha:t his understanding knew was the idea and not the thing.
It is rather obvi ou II that

5)

Deseartcu~ t

in his solution to

the question of error, has oontused consent with

9;88$11t.

It 1s

in thi8 con.tu.s1on, perhaps, 'that the best retutat10n of volitional 3udgment is to be found.

sentially d1!terent.

For assent and oonsent are es-

ltThe former,» as Father Ulaher points out,.

:ltl. intellectual. acquiescence in something as t.,rue; the latter
i:lvolUlltal:'7 Mmpl.aoellC';1 in sOlneth.ing as ~ ••17

i'hi.$ 1s only

to sq that the f01".l'n&1 objeot ot the understanding is the true.
while 'bhe forsaai object of the will is the good.

Now s.ineein

j~ents. the truth is being Bought. 1t is eVident that the w111

ean

ha¥&

no foI1lt(f.l

Let us point

. '6)

an:r .n..:t.'t1tll
~"Wh_

~t

their formation •

uso that the vdll oannot be moved b7

ettie1ent c_use,

mu$t $Oft 1 tselt •

tion.

part. 1n

In order to be free, the will

Jut Desoartes would. have 'the will being most

it is mo$'b determined. which seems to be a. contradic ....

!l'he lntellEtct cannot b. the eff'leient cause of the will t

beOau.e it 1$ the formal cause.

t_ll.Ht

":t"9 an Ubixe4 goed..

e.g., the Deatit1e Vision. then

th.$·ull would be necessitated.
oe~

not; be free..

It the thing known by the in-

But in th1ecase the till would

NoJ.- 1s the will tree concerning the good

ingneral, sinee this is lts formal o"btfect, and no ;faculty can
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indi.tte~ent

be

to ita formal object.

In other words .. there are

times when the will 1$ free and indiffer.nt, and times when it
But to say .. as Descartes does t that it oould be

is determined.

both at the same time would olearly b. .. contradiction.
7)

Desc8.l:'tes,

a.nyt~to

8S

we saw, repGe.tedly denied that God. had

do with .rror.

For this reason he denied even the

ooneurrenee ot GOd in an erl"Oneou8 act.
l'O~

is a. priva.tion, hOwever. does not leave God out of the p1c-

~.

i()~.

l.nSO

tar d

lJlUlilt

Mereq sayi."\g that er-

eat

is a privation is something, and is a privation

Therefore, God

111 is %+otall that it $hould be.

conour in such an act" 'because this act is a being t a. oon-

tins~'lf b.~ll$'

and all beings depend upon God u

their efficient

cautiJe,,,,, fhi,s does J?ot meant however, that God is the author ot
e~~.

QU,1te the contra.ry.

it!s .. 'b.'irlg,

·antt

trom lMUl 1nao far

is

er~neous

The a.e1i comes from God insofar u

1n t.h1. respeot it 1$ good.
l!l$

The act <ilomes

it is this being l and in this respEII,at it

or evil.

To sum up Descartes' doctrine in a sentence t wetind that
eXTOl: ie a privation proceeding from the judgmen.t, wh1ch1s an
8.4$.,0! the will af.t1ming a:r denying what 1,$

tb.tl 1.U.l.d.:erstanding.,
t:1.0;l, i$

untenable.

to it by

But for therea.8ona stated a.bove. this posi-

We W01.l.l4 .ratheit' otfer th1B solution: Error

is, .' positive di.etiOrt10tl prooeed,ing from
tel18G~t

pres~ted

"he ju4gment ot the in-

moved b.1 the Will in lieu o£ objective eVidence.

..
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